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ABSTRACT:
China’s trade secrets protections are not the result of
developments in its own industry, but rather the outcomes of US–
China trade negotiations. This article is a first attempt at
comprehensively examining how the US has affected the
development of China’s trade secrets regime, primarily through its
strong Special 301 process. Based on the historical development
route, it is argued that every legal amendment to add stricter rules to
the regime to enhance legislative protection levels in China followed
US “recommendations.” Such a development path has resulted in the
current trade secrets protection regime’s lack of accounting for local
industry’s needs and interests. Evidence demonstrates that the
current strict trade secrets regime in China exceeds the local
industry’s needs and may impede local industrial innovations. The
interests of local industry are being neglected because of the
substantial representation of US industrial interests in China’s legal
amendments. Since the US industry’s interests conflict considerably
with the interests of local industry, the current strict regime in China
may only benefit the US industry by preserving their competitive
edge at the expense of unduly impeding the development of the local
industry. Meanwhile, this evolutionary path has made many local
scholars take trade secrets protection for granted and put the research
focus mainly on further enhancing protections, without taking a step
back to examine basic theories and limiting doctrines. In light of the
development route and the accompanying negative consequences,
this article suggests some directions that China may move towards at
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the legislative, academic, and enforcement levels. The author seeks
not to repudiate the benefits of the current strict Chinese rules for
effectively protecting trade secrets and only suggests instituting more
reasonable limiting doctrines to enable the country’s trade secrets law
to better serve its policy goals.
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INTRODUCTION
2019 and 2020 were two landmark years in the history of the
development of trade secrets protection in China. China’s approach
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of trade secrets protection witnessed significant changes or, more
precisely, crucial enhancements in the past two years. Not only were
statutes concerning trade secrets protection amended, but new
judicial interpretations were also delivered and new regulations of
trade secrets were released.1 These new laws and regulations have
become the focus of discussion among legal practitioners, with many
of them optimistically expecting these new provisions to sufficiently
protect trade secrets in the future. 2
At first glance, it is understandable why China made these
notable amendments or additions to its trade secrets protection. The
simplest explanation is that trade secrets demand a stricter protection
regime due to their importance. As a lately developed intangible right
compared with traditional IP rights, trade secrets’ importance is being
increasingly recognized around the world. Trade secrets are
considered a crucial mechanism for enterprises to compete with
others and promote innovations. 3 US firms highly value trade secrets
protection, as it can safeguard a wider range of sensitive information
than patents, without governmental registration or approval
1 The Anti-Unfair Competition Law was amended in 2019 which mainly revised the
trade secret protection provisions. For one example of a new judicial interpretation, see Fan
Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (反不正当竞争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law],
promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993;
rev’d by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 4, 2017; rev’d by Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 23, 2019, CLI.1.331488(EN) (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter 2019
AUCL]; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Qinfan Shangye Mimi Minshi Anjian
Shiyong Falv Ruogan Wenti de Guiding, Fashi [2020] Qi Hao (最高人民法院关于审理侵
犯商业秘密民事案件适用法律若干问题的规定, 法释 [2020] 7号) [Provisions of the
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial
of Civil Cases Involving Infringements upon Trade Secrets No. 7 [2020]], promulgated by
Sup. People’s Ct.., Sept. 10, 2020, effective Sept. 12, 2020, CLI.3.345991(EN)
(Lawinfochina) [hereinafter 2020 Judicial Interpretation]. For the new administrative
regulation, see Shangye Mimi Baohu Guiding (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) (商业秘密保护规定
(征求意见稿)) [Regulations on Trade Secrets Protection (Draft for Public Comment)],
published
by
STATE
ADMIN.
MKT.
REGUL.,
Sept.
4.
2020,
http://www.moj.gov.cn/news/content/2020-09/04/zlk_3255345.html
[https://perma.cc/6QQB-AVWU] [hereinafter 2020 Administration Regulation (Draft)].
2 See e.g., Recent Changes to China’s Trade Secret Protection Laws Ease the
Challenge
of
Bringing
Such
Cases,
JONES
DAY
(Oct.
2020),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/10/recent-changes-to-chinas-trade-secretprotection-laws [https://perma.cc/9W9N-5A75] (saying that adding burden shifting clauses
into the AUCL eases the challenges of bring trade secrets cases in China).
3 Dan Kim et al., U.S. International Trade Commission’s Trade Secrets Roundtable:
Discussion Summary, J. INT’L COM. & ECON. 1, 2 (Nov. 2016),
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/linton_semanik_trade_secrets_summary_
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AVJ-3M7W].
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processes.4 Meanwhile, smaller companies or start-ups rely heavily
on trade secrets rather than patents due to the high cost of patent
application.5 Chinese enterprises are also gradually realizing this
importance, considering trade secrets as the core of their business
assets.6 Some countries, moreover, view trade secrets theft as serious
conduct harming national security and economy. 7 Trade secrets’
importance is also recognized internationally. For example, Article
39 of the TRIPS Agreement requires each WTO member to protect
undisclosed information in their domestic law. 8 The APEC
economies have classified trade secrets as a useful element of an
intellectual property toolkit available to businesses, which can
“promote APEC economies’ economic, innovation, and social policy
goals.”9 Given this significance of trade secrets protection, China’s
substantial amendment of its trade secrets regime is understandable.
However, the story is not that simple. The main driver for
enhancing protection is not the self-realization of the necessity for
improving trade secrets protection but external pressure from the US.
4

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
6 Zhang Wei (张维), Baohu Shangye Mimi Jiushi Baohu Qiye Zui Hexin Caifu (保护
商业秘密就是保护企业最核心财富) [Protecting Trade Secrets is Protecting the Core of
the Firm Asset], FAZHENG YAOWEN (法政要闻) [LEGAL NEWS] (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/GacKybUcQDsWklYdjpJXNQ
[https://perma.cc/9MLLSXAE].
7 For example, the US government argued that trade secret theft “threatens national
security and the U.S. economy, diminishes U.S. prospects around the globe, and puts
American jobs at risk.’’ U.S. Trade Representative, 2013 Special 301 Report 13 (May 2013),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05012013%202013%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W9ZK-C9PJ] [hereinafter 2013 Special 301 Report]. Similar expressions
can also be found in the Special 301 reports of 2014 to 2020. Some executives in PRC
National Security Bureau also opined that protecting trade secrets is to protect national
economic security. See Du Yongsheng (杜永胜) & Wang Tuanhui (王团辉), Baohu Shangye
Mimi Jiushi Baohu Guojia Jingji Anquan (保护商业秘密就是保护国家经济安全)
[Protecting Trade Secrets is to Protect National Economic Security], ZUGUO (祖国)
[MOTHERLAND], no.6, 2014.
8 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Rambod Behboodi,
Trade Secrets in International Law: The WTO’s Secrets of the Trade, JDSUPRA (Aug. 24,
2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trade-secrets-in-international-law-the-26679
[https://perma.cc/MGP9-L2AW].
9 APEC, Best Practices in Trade Secret Protection and Enforcement Against
Misappropriation,
USTR
Press
Release
1,
1
(Nov.
21,
2016),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/11202016-US-Best-Practices-Trade-Secrets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VQ7-HSRY].
5
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All these new legal changes in China are related to the US–China
trade war and the recently signed “U.S.–China Economic and Trade
Agreement (Phase One agreement).” 10 Trade secrets are a significant
issue in the US–China trade war and also a crucial part of the Phase
One agreement.11 Apart from the recent trade war and its related
agreement, trade secrets protection in China has always been one of
the primary targets of US criticism.12 China has responded to US
criticism several times through many statutory amendments, judicial
interpretations, and other related regulations. 13
Very few works in the extant literature in China touch upon
the development of a trade secrets regime or discuss how it is affected
by external pressure. Although many works discuss how the US
pushed China to enhance its intellectual property protections in
general,14 not many specifically examine the trade secrets law. Only
one work published in early 2019 is targeted at the US influence on
China’s trade secrets protection. 15 However, it mainly provides a
10 See U.S. Trade Representative, 2020 Special 301 Report 41–42 (Apr. 2020),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2020_Special_301_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY2SA9X5] [hereinafter 2020 Special 301 Report]. See also The Facts and China’s Position on
China-US Trade Friction, Info. Off. PRC St. Council 1, 35–36 (Sept. 2018),
http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2018-09/25/content_63998615.htm
[https://perma.cc/W8L6-PMUR].
11 The whole section B of the Phase one agreement is dealing with the trade secret
protections. See Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, PRC-U.S., sec.
B, Jan. 15, 2020, OFF. USTR, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongoliataiwan/peoples-republic-china/phase-one-trade-agreement/text
[https://perma.cc/7QTEJMLU] [hereinafter Phase One agreement]. See also 2020 Special 301 Report, supra note
10, at 41–42; U.S. Trade Representative, 2019 Special 301 Report 41-42 (Apr. 2019),
[hereinafter
2019
Special
301
Report],
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Special_301_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3F7S5Q3].
12 Ever since 2012, trade secret protections in China have become one of the main
discussion themes of US Trade Representatives in their yearly realized special 301 reports.
These reports discuss the current situation of trade secret protections in China and provide
suggestions for China to improve the system. For details of this special 301 report
mechanism, see infra part I.
13 For details of how China responded to US’s criticisms, see infra part II.
14
See e.g., Xiong Jie (熊洁), Meiguo “Tebie 301 Baogao” Yu Zhongmei Jingmao
Guanxi Zhong de Zhishi Chanquan Wenti (美国”特别301报告”与中美经贸关系中的知识
产权问题) [The IP Related Issues in China-US Trade Relations in US Special 301 Reports],
MEIGUO WENTI YANJIU (美国问题研究) [FUDAN AME. REV.], no.1, 2019 (discussing the IPR
issues raised by the US in the Special 301 Reports and US-China trade relations and how
these affected China).
15 See Song Shiyong (宋世勇) & Xing Yuxia (邢玉霞), Meiguo Tebie 301 Baogao
Shangye Mimi Wenti Zongshu Yu Zhongguo Duice Fenxi (美国《特别301 报告》商业秘
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summary of what trade secrets issues in China were identified each
year between 2012 to 2018 by the US government, without
identifying the exact relationship between these identified issues and
China’s legal responses.16 The said work also does not touch the
years 2019 and 2020, when trade secrets protection in China was
again significantly enhanced due to the US pressure. In this sense,
this article intends to serve as a first attempt at thoroughly discussing
how the US pressure gradually pushed China’s trade secrets law into
an increasingly stricter regime. Using historical facts, this article
argues that because of the huge influence from the US on such an
evolution, China’s trade secrets protection has been enhanced to a
considerably high level. This has resulted in a lack of consideration
for the interests of local industry in the current strict regime, which
may harm the local industry’s development. Moreover, this article
argues that such a development path under US pressure makes local
academia misplace their research focus by taking basic theories and
stricter protection for granted, without questioning why or whether
we really need such enhanced protection. In light of these negative
consequences, the article hopes to provide some preliminary
suggestions and rough directions for China to move towards in the
future.
To put forward these arguments and suggestions, this article
is structured as follows: Part 1 introduces the basics of trade secrecy
and the mechanisms used by the US to exert influence on China’s
trade secrets protection regime. Part 2 discusses the history of
China’s trade secrets protection regime and how it is influenced by
US pressure. Part 3 sets forth the problems caused by such a
development route—insufficient consideration of local industry
needs and a weak local theoretical basis. Part 4 provides some
suggestions for China based on the discussion and is followed by the
Conclusion.

密问题综述与中国对策分析) [Summary of the Trade Secrets Issues in US Special 301
Reports and the Analysis of China’s Responsive Measures], FAXUE ZAZHI (法学杂志) [L.
MAG.], no. 5, 2019 (discussing the trade secrets related issues in Special 301 reports
generally and China’s legal reforms on trade secrets law).
16 See id.
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TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION AND THE US POLICY
TOWARDS CHINA

Trade secrets can be defined as undisclosed information that
is deliberately kept secret from the public by firms. Trade secrets do
not require nonobviousness of information as required by patents and
can cover unpatentable information. 17 Thus, trade secrets can cover
a very wide range of information, including but not limited to
business information such as customer lists, price lists, and marketing
strategies and technical information such as technical processes or
methods.18 All such information can be treated as trade secrets, as
long as it satisfies the requirements. Modern trade secrets law
requires keeping such information secret from the public, deriving
independent commercial value from the information, and ensuring
reasonable efforts to keep the information secret. 19 But trade secrets
protection law does not protect against independent development and
reverse engineering.20 Even though the protections afforded by trade
secrecy is more limited compared to patents, many firms still desire
to protect patentable ideas through trade secrets instead of patents.
This is potentially because trade secrets do not have an expiration
date and do not necessitate an expensive and costly application
process as with patents.21 Empirical studies show that many firms
17 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. R. 241, 248 (1998).
18 See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 (4) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985) [hereinafter UTSA];
Katherine Linton, The Importance of Trade Secrets: New Directions in International Trade
Policy Making and Empirical Research, J. INT’L COM. & ECON. 1, 3 (Sept., 2016),
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/katherine_linton_importance_of_trade_se
crets_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WUL-PQ33].
19 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 39 (2); USTA § 1 (4); 2019 AUCL, supra
note 1, at art. 9; Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 317–18 (2008); KONG X IANGJUN (孔祥俊), FANBUZHENGDANG
JINGZHENG FA XINYUANLI FENLUN 360–61 (反不正当竞争法新原理分论) [THE NEW
PRINCIPLES OF ANTI-UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: SUBSECTION] (2019).
20 See USTA § 1; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 39; AUCL 2019, supra note
19, at art 9; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Buzhengdang Jingzheng Minshi Anjian
Yingyong Falv Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi, Fashi [2007] No. 2 (最高人民法院关于审理不正
当竞争民事案件应用法律若干问题的解释, 法释[2007]2号) [Interpretation of the
Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of
Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition, Judicial Interpretation [2007] No. 2]
(promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 12, 2007, effective Feb. 1,
2007), art. 12, CLI.3.83311(EN) (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter 2007 Judicial Interpretation
on AUCL] ; Lemley, supra note 19, at 318; KONG, supra note 19, at 448–53.
21 Linton, supra note 18, at 4–5.
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prefer trade secrets rather than other IP rights, especially patents. 22
Economic theories demonstrate that firms are more likely to keep
information as a trade secret, and not patent it when “they believe that
patent protection is too costly relative to the value of their invention,
or that it will give them a reward substantially less than the benefit of
their invention” because the length (or other conditions) of patent
protection is insufficient. 23 Widely endorsed by firms to maintain
their competitive edge, trade secrets’ significance to businesses and
the entire economy has gradually been realized by the US
government. In 2013, the US government issued the “Administration
Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets,” highlighting
“U.S. efforts to combat the theft of trade secrets that could be used by
foreign governments or companies to gain an unfair economic
advantage by harming U.S. innovation and creativity.”24 To address
trade secrets protection concerns in other countries, the US has
maintained its original mechanism in dealing with other IPR
concerns, namely, the Special 301 process. 25
The Special 301 process, albeit a domestic legal process, is
the unilateral but proven effective mechanism of the US government
to influence the intellectual property law and practice in other
countries. Its aim is to “persuade” US trading countries to reform
their intellectual property protection regime to promote the adequate
and effective protection of intellectual property rights.26 Every year,
pursuant to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 (as amended by the
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act), the office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) is required to provide a
Special 301 Report outlining the situation of IP protection among US
trading partners and identify countries that do not provide adequate
and effective protection of IP rights. 27 Specifically, the USTR
22

Id. at 6.
David D. Friedman et al.., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
61, 64 (1991).
24 2013 Special 301 Report, supra note 7, at 13–14; Administration Strategy on
Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, U.S. Exec. Off. President (Feb. 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/938321/download
[https://perma.cc/7LUJF84J].
25 See supra Part II (about how the US used the special 301 process to address its trade
secrets protection concerns in China).
26 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Special 301: Its Requirements, Implementation,
and Significance, 13 FORDAM INT’L L. J. 259, 259 (1989).
27 19 U.S.C § 2242 (a) – (b) (1988); 2020 Special 301 Report, supra note 10, at 4;
Myles Getlan, TRIPs and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study in Trade Dispute
23
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identifies foreign countries that have the most onerous or egregious
acts, policies, or practices that deny adequate and effective
intellectual property rights and have the most adverse impact on US
products, as priority foreign countries. 28 However, if such “countries
are entering into, or making significant progress in, good faith
negotiations, the USTR is precluded by the statute from identifying
them as priority countries.”29 Additionally, the USTR creates a
priority watch list and a watch list for certain trading partners who
meet “some, but not all, of the criteria for priority foreign country
identification” and therefore require further monitoring.30 The USTR
can, at any time, identify additional priority foreign countries or
revoke any identification.31 Within 30 days after identifying a
priority foreign country, the USTR is required to initiate an
investigation on the IP protection status of that country.32 This
involves conversations with the foreign country to seek negotiable
bilateral solutions, to be typically completed within 6 months.33 If
such a country is not making substantial progress in addressing the
identified IP protection problems within the investigation period, the
USTR is authorized to take trade-related actions such as suspending
or withdrawing trade concessions, imposing additional duties or
import restrictions, or recommending initiating the WTO dispute
resolution process.34 The ultimate purpose is to push identified
countries to amend their current IP protection regime, either
“voluntarily” or through bilateral agreements, according to the
USTR’s suggestions in the Special 301 Report.
History has shown the Special 301 process to be a success. In
order to gain more access to the global market controlled by
Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 173, 182 (1996); Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s
Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 87, 95 (1994).
28 19 U.S.C § 2242 (b) (1988).
29 U.S. Trade Representative, 1989 Special 301 Report 1 (May 1989) [hereinafter 1989
Special
301
Report],
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/1989%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LE3V-HFEZ]; see 19 U.S.C § 2242 (b) (C) (1988).
30
Liu, supra note 27, at 95; see U.S. Trade Representative, 2016 Special 301 Report 1
(Apr.
2016),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A7G7-KEKQ] [hereinafter 2016 Special 301 Report].
31 19 U.S.C § 2242 (c) (1988).
32 19 U.S.C § 2412 (b)(2)(A) (1988).
33 19 U.S.C § 2414 (a)(3)(A)–(B) (1988); Bello & Holmer, supra note 26, at 262.
34 19 U.S.C § 2411 (c) (1988); 19 U.S.C § 2414 (a)(3) (1988); 19 U.S.C § 2416 (b)
(1988).
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developed countries, especially the US, and fearing potential trade
sanctions, developing countries normally follow the suggestions to
enhance their IP protections. 35 For example, in response to US
pressure from the Special 301 process, China has made several
concessions through different China–US bilateral agreements, such
as the 1992 China–US Memorandum of Understanding,36 the US–
China IPR Enforcement Agreement, 37 and the Phase One
agreement.38 The US consistently uses this Special 301 process to
successfully push its trading partners who enjoy a trade surplus with
the US, especially China, to address its IPR concerns. Though the
most frequently addressed concerns are still copyright, patents, and
trademarks,39 recent years have seen increasing focus of the USTR
on trade secrets. Starting in 2012, “Trade Secrets and Forced
Technology Transfer” has become one of the main aspects of the

35 See Ke Shao, What May Validate Intellectual Property in a Traditional Chinese
Mind? Examining the U.S.-China IP Disputes Through a Historical Inquiry, 1 J. Info. L. &
Tech. 1, 3 (2006)
36 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of
Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, T.I.A.S No. 12,036 [hereinafter 1992 Memorandum].
This memorandum was responding to the USTR’s listing of China as priority country in
1991. See U.S. Trade Representative, 1991 Special 301 Report 2 (Apr. 1991),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/1991%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z6T7-BH4L] [hereinafter 1991 Special 301 Report]; Dexin Tian, The
USTR Special 301 Reports: An analysis of the US hegemonic pressure upon the
organizational change in China’s IPR regime, 1 Chinese J. Commc’n 224, 228 (2008).
37 See U.S. Trade Representative, 1995 Special 301 Report 3 (Apr. 1995),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/1995%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SMT6-29BK] [hereinafter 1995 Special 301 Report]. This agreement was
responding to the USTR’s listing of China as potential priority foreign country in 1994
report. See U.S. Trade Representative, 1994 Special 301 Report (Apr. 1994),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/1994%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8TSR-K6TN] [hereinafter 1994 Special 301 Report]; Xiong, supra note
14, at 27.
38 Phase One agreement, supra note 11; This agreement was responding to the Special
301 investigation initiated by the USTR in 2017. See USTR Announces Initiation of Section
301 Investigation of China, USTR Press Release (Aug. 18, 2017) (announcing investigation
of Chinese trade practices), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiation-section
[https://perma.cc/6FH9-5U9D];
Xiong, supra note 14, at 28; 2020 Special 301 Report, supra note 10, at 39.
39 From 1989 to date, every Special 301 reports address the concerns of copyright,
patents, and trademark protections in US trading countries. The effectiveness of the
enforcement of these IP rights are also addressed in reports. In contrast, trade secrets
protection started to be detailly discussed in 2012. Previous reports before 2012 either do
not mention trade secrets or only provide very abstract description of trade secrets.
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Special 301 Report published by the USTR. 40 Meanwhile, after 2012,
China has been consistently identified by the Special 301 report as a
country whose trade secrets protection is far from complete, which
causes harm to US companies, and economic and security interests. 41
The US suggestions for improving China’s trade secrets protection
regime range from broad recommendations for a PRC standalone
trade secrets law to detailed requests, such as, promoting the
availability of preliminary injunctions, and reducing the difficulty of
gathering evidence in trade secrets cases.42 As elaborated in the next
section, China has consistently made concessions in response to
Special 301 process requests concerning trade secrets protection
issues. These concessions provide proof of the substantial influence
the US exerts on the current strict trade secrets regime in China.

II.

HISTORY OF TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION IN CHINA:
THE US INFLUENCE

The current trade secrets protection regime in China
encompasses different areas of law such as contract law, employment
law, employment contract law, criminal law, and Anti-Unfair
Competition Law (AUCL). 43 With regard to commercial and
administrative remedies, the main part of the protection regime is still
the AUCL and its related judicial interpretations and administrative
regulations. Other laws such as contract law and employment-related
law only provide limited or symbolic protection, with the most
40

See U.S. Trade Representative, 2012 Special 301 Report 17–18 (Apr. 2012)
(reporting developments in intellectual property rights protection and enforcement)
[hereinafter
2012
Special
301
Report],
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/862E-5862].
41 See e.g., 2013 Special 301 Report, supra note 7, at 13; 2020 Special 301 Report,
supra note 10, at 18.
42 See e.g., U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Special 301 Report 30 (Apr. 2017)
(outlining
current
Chinese
IP
challenges)
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special%20301%20Report%20FINAL.PD
F [https://perma.cc/A2HN-H5UM] [hereinafter 2017 Special 301 Report]; U.S. Trade
Representative,
2015
Special
301
Report
36
(Apr.
2015),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Special-301-Report-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ACT8-RSG9] [hereinafter 2015 Special 301 Report].
43 See Yang Zhengyu (杨正宇), Meiguo Shangye Mimi Dandu Lifa Moshi (美国商业
秘密单独立法模式探究与启示) [The Research on and Insights From the Stand-Alone
Trade Secret Law in the US], MINSHANG FA LUNCONG (民商法论丛) [COLLECTION C IV. &
COM. L.], vol. 70, no.1, 2020, at 219–21 (reporting innovations in trade secrets law).
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substantial protection still being provided in the AUCL.44 This article
only discusses the main parts of the protection regime, rather than all
of it. The historical development of this trade secrets protection
regime can be divided into four phases. The development phase
before 1993 was a period when China was exploring how to protect
“trade secrets” without substantial outside influence. However, as
discussed below, the “trade secrets” protection then was very
different from that after this period because, at that time, “trade
secrets” were protected through contractual obligations. The
doctrines in contract law were mainly relied upon to provide limited
protection. Thus, the development of the current protection regime
mainly started in 1993. Every development phase after 1993
(including 1993) was substantially affected by US influence. As
elaborated in subsequent parts, this article argues, through historical
analysis, that each time the US triggered further enhancements of
trade secrets’ legislative protection in China, and even, in substance,
stipulated which stricter rules China should add to the regime. China
bowed to the pressure, nearly every time after 1993.
A.

Pre-1993

No historical material before the enactment of AUCL in 1993
shows that China’s development of a “trade secrets” protection
regime at the time was affected by the US. We can thus attribute the
development of the law in that period to China’s local needs. The
trade secrets protection can be traced back to 1985 when the PRC
State Council enacted the Regulations on the Administration of
Technology Acquisition Contracts (Hereinafter the 1985 Regulation).
In article 7, the regulation required contracting parties to undertake
the duty of confidentiality, if agreed in a contract, for any undisclosed
secrets.45 In other words, the validity of the confidentiality clause for
trade secrets was recognized by this regulation, and contracting
44

Id. at 220.
Jishu Yinjin Hetong Guanli Tiaoli (技术引进合同管理条例) [Regulations on the
Administration of Technology Acquisition Contracts] (promulgated by ST. COUNCIL, May
24, 1985, effective May 24, 1985), at art. 7, CLI.2.2416(EN) (Lawinfochina); Cui Wangwei
(崔汪卫), Yi Quanli Wei Zhongxin Goujian Wanshan de Shangye Mimi Falv Tixi (以权利
为中心构建完善的商业秘密法律体系) [Establish a More Perfect Legal System of Trade
Secret Protections Through the Center of Rights], HUANAN LIGONG DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI
KEXUE BAN) (华南理工大学学报（社会科学版）) [J. S. CHINA UNIV. TECH. (SOC. SCI.
EDITION)], vol. 18, no. 2, 2016, at 58.
45
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parties were free to use contract clauses to protect their secrets. Thus,
this regulation did not add more protections to trade secrets than
normal contract law, as the applied protection was just respecting the
contracting parties’ autonomy within their specific contract.
Apart from this regulation, some scholars argue that article
118 of the 1986 General Principles of Civil Law (Hereinafter 1986
GPCL) indirectly recognized trade secrets as a form of intangible
property rights.46
Article 118 said that copyright, patents,
trademarks, rights of discovery, rights of inventions, or any other
technological achievements are protected from infringement. 47 The
phrase “other technological achievements” is argued as including
trade secrets so that the 1986 GPCL actually provided the same level
of protection for trade secrets as other intellectual property rights. 48
However, this argument is not correct. One of the legislators of the
1986 GPCL said that “other technological achievements” included
the right of rationalization, the right to technological improvement,
and the right to scientific and technological progress, without
mentioning trade secrets.49 The inclusion of trade secret provisions
in the 1993 AUCL was meant to deal with the problem of lack of
trade secrets protection in China before 1993. 50 Therefore, it is more
reasonable to interpret “other technological achievements” in the
1986 GPCL as not including trade secrets.
The first time the phrase “trade secrets” was mentioned was
in the 1991 Civil Procedure Law. Article 66 thereof required that any
evidence concerning trade secrets should be kept secret. 51 Article 120
allowed parties to apply for closed hearings if the case involved trade
secrets.52 However, as we can see from these two provisions, both
46

Cui, supra note 45, at 58.
Minfa Tongze (民法通则) [General Principles of Civil Law], promulgated by Nat’l
People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), at art. 118, CLI.1.2780(EN)
(Lawinfochina).
48 See Cui, supra note 45, at 58; Zhou Peng (周澎), Zhongmei Shangye Mimi Baohu
Wenti Ji Duice Yanjiu (中美商业秘密保护问题及对策研究) [Research on the Trade Secret
Protection in China & the US and on the Responsive Measures], FAXUE ZAZHI (法学杂志)
[L. MAG.], at 133 (comparing the methods of protecting trade secrets in the US and China,
while the latter adopts the method of protecting through different laws).
49 KONG, supra note 19, at 354.
50 Id.
51 Minshi Susong Fa (民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure Law], promulgated by Nat’l
People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1991, effective Sept. 4, 1991), at art. 66, CLI.1.5110 (EN)
(Lawinfochina).
52 Id. at art 120.
47
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were procedural rules, and neither provided any true protection for
trade secrets in infringement cases. Accordingly, we can conclude
that during this pre-1993 phase, the self-developed trade secrets
protection regime did not provide any substantial or real protection
for trade secrets in China in addition to contractual protection.
Instead, information that fulfilled the requirements of trade secrets
back then could only be protected through contract law. The
development of a “true” trade secrets protection regime began with
the 1993 AUCL.
B.

1993 to 2012

In 1991, the Special 301 Report published by the USTR
mentioned the trade secrets protection situation in China for the first
time. In the report, China was identified as the priority foreign
country because it did not offer adequate patent protection or
copyright protection, and trademarks were granted to the first
registrant, and “trade secrets [were] not adequately protected in
China.”53 This was also the first time that China was classified as a
priority foreign country by the Special 301 Report. Accordingly, an
investigation into China’s alleged inadequate protection of
intellectual property was initiated by the USTR.54 The listing as a
priority foreign country and the consequent investigation posed a
significant threat to China at that time because China was in fear of
potential trade sanctions from the US and also the US’ negative
stance on China’s return to the WTO.55 All these factors triggered
negotiations between China and the US; for example, two rounds of
negotiations were held, in June 1991 in Beijing and in August 1991
in Washington.56 After 6 rounds of negotiations, the US and China
reached the 1992 China–US Memorandum of Understanding. 57 Vide
article 4 of the Memorandum, the Chinese government promised to
53

1991 Special 301 Report, supra note 36, at 2 (emphasis added).
Wayne M. Morrison, Enforcing U.S. Trade Laws: Section 301 and China, CONG.
RSCH.
SERV.
(Jul.
23,
2018),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=813691
[https://perma.cc/W4W5-9555].
55 See Ke, supra note 35 , at 5; WU H AIMING (吴海民), DAGUO DE JIAOLIANG:
ZHONGMEI ZHISHI CHANQUAN TANPAN SHILU 16–17 (大国的较量:中美知识产权谈判实录)
[POWER CONTEST: THE RECORD OF US-CHINA NEGOTIATION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ISSUES] (2009).
56 WU, supra note 55, at 38, 44.
57 For details of 6 rounds of negotiations, see id. at 38–110.
54
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provide trade secrets protection, which required China to prevent
trade secrets’ misappropriation, in accordance with article 10 bis of
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.58 It
also obliged China to allow protection for trade secrets to continue so
long as the conditions requiring such protection are met (indefinite
period).59 The deadlines by which the law providing such levels of
protection were to be submitted to the legislative body (July 1, 1993)
and enacted (January 1, 1994) were specified in this provision as
well.60 As we can infer from the wording of article 4, the required
trade secrets protection in the Memorandum was not contractual
protection but something more akin to other intellectual property
protections.61 This marks the beginning of the development of the
current trade secrets protection regime in China.
The 1993 AUCL was thus drafted and promulgated under the
pressure of the 1992 Memorandum. Trade secrets protection became
one of the main planks of the 1993 AUCL. However, because of the
tight legislative schedule, China had to transplant nearly wholly from
other countries’ laws or from institutional rules in designing the trade
secrets protection regime. 62 The trade secrets protection regime in
the 1993 AUCL, in particular, was derived substantially from article
39 of the TRIPS agreement. 63 According to article 10 of the 1993
58

See 1992 Memorandum, supra note 36, at article 4 (reporting China’s commitment
to preventing trade secrets disclosure in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 For example, article 4 required protections for trade secrets in the scenarios when
third parties misappropriated trade secrets. Such protections are not available in contract law
doctrines because of the principle of privity. See id.
62 See Hou Yangkun (侯仰坤), Lun Shangye Mimi Baohu de Lishi Juxianxing Ji Qi
Yuanyin (论商业秘密保护的历史局限性及其原因) [Discussions on the Historic
Limitations and Reasons of Current Trade Secret Protections], ZHONGGUO MINSHANG FALV
WANG (中国民商法律网) [CHINA CIV. & COM. L. WEBSITE], no. 11, 2006, at Part 2.2,
http://old.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=37292
[https://perma.cc/QJX2-CTGN];
Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanbuzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (Caoan) de
Shuoming (关于《中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法（草案）》的说明) [Notes on “The
People’s Republic of China Anti-Unfair Competition Law (Draft)”], ZHONGGUO RENDA
WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA PEOPLE’S CONG.] (Jun. 22, 1993), at part 2,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/28/content_5003002.htm
[https://perma.cc/H5B6-7Y9F] (mentioning that for drafting this law, the relevant authority
collected and researched into many foreign legal materials and cases. It also sent
representatives to the US and the South Korea for research purposes during the process of
drafting this law).
63 See He Ming (赫敏), Zhongguo Shangye Mimi de Lifa, Bohu Kunjing Ji Duice (中
国商业秘密的立法、保护困境及对策) [The China’s Trade Secrets Legislation,
Difficulties, and Solutions], MEIZHONG SHIBAO [美中时报] [SINO US TIMES] (Jun. 21, 2018),
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AUCL, trade secrets are considered technology or business
information with commercial value and practical applicability, which
were kept secret (unknown to the public) through confidential
measures.64 Most requirements for classification as trade secrets in
the 1993 AUCL, except for the requirement of practical applicability,
were similar to the requirements in article 39 of the TRIPS
agreement.65 Additionally, the 1993 AUCL provided a similar level
of protection for trade secrets as TRIPS, whereby they both prevented
trade secrets from being misappropriated, defined as being disclosed
to, acquired by, or used by others (including third parties who know
or ought to know of the misappropriation) in a manner contrary to
honest commercial practices (i.e., breach of duty of confidence, theft,
inducement).66 One point to note, however, is that article 39 of
TRIPS was also significantly influenced by the US. Firstly, the trade
secrets protection was added to the TRIPS agreement mainly through
the efforts of US negotiators, which were later supported by the
European Community and other industrialized groups.67 Secondly,
because of the influence the US had in adding trade secrets protection
to TRIPS, article 39 of TRIPS, to a great extent, incorporated
principles from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).68 The
definition and requirements of trade secrets contained in the
subsections (a) through (c) of Article 39(2) are modeled after the
definition of ‘trade secret’ that is contained in the USTA.”69 The nonexclusive list of practices that are deemed as conduct contrary to
http://sinoustimes.com/contents/323/25503.html
[https://perma.cc/68UB-ZJT9];
Luo
Yuzhong (罗玉中) & Zhang Xiaojin (张晓津), Trips Yu Wo Guo Shangye Mimi De Falv
Baohu (Trips与我国商业秘密的法律保护) [Trips and the Legal Protection of Trade
Secrets in China], ZHONGWAI FAXUE (中外法学) [PEKING UNIV. L. J.], no.3, 1999, at 27.
64 Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (反不正当竞争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law],
promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1,
1993), art. 10, CLI.1.6359(EN) (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter 1993 AUCL].
65 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 39.2 (a) – (c); The requirement of practical
applicability limited the scope of trade secrets in China substantially and makes the trade
secret protection in China not adequate as required in the TRIPs. Therefore, this requirement
was abandoned in 2017.
66 See 1993 AUCL, supra note 64, at art 10; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art.
39.2 and footnote 10; Luo & Zhang, supra note 63, at 27.
67 See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Limits of Trade Secret Law: Article 39 of the TRIPS
Agreement and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act on which it is Based, in THE LAW AND THEORY
OF TRADE SECRECY 537, 537, 541, 552, 567 (2011). For a history of how article 39 was
included and drafted into TRIPS, please see pages 541–552 of this chapter; see also, Hou,
supra note 62, at part 2.1.
68 Sandeen, supra note 67, at 552.
69 Id. at 538.
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honest business practices contained in footnote 10 of TRIPS is similar
to the UTSA’s definition of misappropriation. 70 However, because
article 10 of the 1993 AUCL was significantly modeled on article 39
of TRIPS, not only was China’s trade secrets protection regime
established because of US pressure but substantial contents of the
regime were also greatly influenced by US frameworks.
After China established the trade secrets protection regime in
the 1993 AUCL, the US did not pay attention to trade secrets issues
in China anymore until 2012. This can be seen in the Special 301
Reports from 1992 to 2011, none of which mention any trade secrets
issues with China.71 During this period, China on its own began to
add details to the trade secrets protection regime, without any longer
substantially increasing the level of protection. In 1995, the first trade
secrets related administrative regulation was promulgated by the
State Administration of Industry & Commerce (hereinafter 1995
Administrative Regulation).72 This administrative regulation was
based on the 1993 AUCL and simply repeated the definition and
requirements of trade secrets, and the non-exclusive list of
misappropriation behaviors in the 1993 AUCL.73 It also provided
some examples of what is included in the technology and business
information as defined in the 1993 ACUL,74 which is similar to the
broad inclusion of what is protected in international standards such
as TRIPS and in other countries such as the US.75 The only details
this administrative regulation added to the protection regime were
regarding how administrative remedies for trade secrets
70

Id.
The focus of the reports during this period was other IPRs such as IP enforcement,
patents, copyright, and trademarks. See e.g., U.S. Trade Representative, 2002 Special 301
Report
(May
2002),
[hereinafter
2002
Special
301
Report],
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2002/2002_Special
_301_Report/asset_upload_file628_6354.pdf [https://perma.cc/SU67-XECS].
72 Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Ju Guanyu Jinzhi Qinfan Shangye Mimi
Xingwei de Ruogan Guiding (国家工商行政管理局关于禁止侵犯商业秘密行为的若干
规定) [Several Provisions on Prohibiting Infringements upon Trade Secrets], promulgated
by State Admin. Indus. Com., Nov. 23, 1995, effective Nov. 23, 1995; revised by State
Admin. Indus. Com., Dec. 3, 1998, effective Dec. 3, 1998), CLI.4.23598(EN)
(Lawinfochina) [hereinafter 1995 SPPI]. Note the 1998 revision did not make significant
changes to the 1995 version.
73 See id. at art. 2 & art. 3.
74 See id. at art. 2.
75 See Cui Mingxia (崔明霞) & Peng Xuelong (彭学龙), Shangye Mimi Falv Baohu
Shiji Huigu (商业秘密法律保护世纪回顾) [The Century Reflections on Trade Secret
Protections], FAXUE LUNTAN (法学论坛) [LEGAL F.], no. 6, 2001, at 33.
71
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misappropriation were granted to right holders. 76 Such details were
based on the abstract provision (article 25) of administrative remedies
for trade secrets in the 1993 AUCL77 and were not meant to further
increase the legislative protection level. Thus, this administrative
regulation did not add any stricter rules to the regime to further
increase the legislative level, as it simply added details to the existing
regime without changing anything in substance.
Another notable addition to the protection regime was the
2007 Judicial Interpretation of the 1993 AUCL. 78 This judicial
interpretation also merely provided details for the trade secrets
protection regime as framed in the 1993 AUCL, without adding
stricter rules. For example, article 9 of the interpretation added a
definition of the “unknown to the public” requirement to the 1993
AUCL and listed six circumstances when information can be deemed
as “unknown to the public.”79 Meanwhile, article 10 of the
interpretation defined the “commercial value” and “practical
applicability” requirements in the 1993 AUCL,80 while article 11
defined the “reasonable measures” requirement and listed seven
typical measures that can satisfy the requirement. 81 These betterclarified definitions did not add any stricter rules or change any
doctrines. It is interesting to note that these expanded more or less
transplanted the definitions from the US. For instance, the definition
of the “unknown to public” requirement in the interpretation is the
same as the definition of secrecy in section 1 (4) of the UTSA (“not
being generally known” and “not being readily ascertainable”). 82
While not providing additional stricter protections, the 2007 Judicial
Interpretation, however, added a limitation to the protection regime
76

See 1995 SPPI, supra note 72, at art. 4–9.
See 1993 AUCL, supra note 64, at art. 25.
78 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Buzhengdang Jingzheng Minshi Anjian
Yingyong Falv Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi, Fashi [2007] Er Hao (最高人民法院关于审理不
正当竞争民事案件应用法律若干问题的解释, 法释 [2007] 2号) [Interpretation of the
Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of
Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition, Judicial Interpretation No. 2 [2007]],
promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 12, 2007, effective Feb. 1, 2007), CLI.3.83311(EN)
(Lawinfochina) [hereinafter 2007 Judicial Interpretation].
79 See id. at art. 9. An interesting point to note is that the definition of “unknown to
public” requirement in the interpretation is the same as the definition of secrecy in the section
1 (4) of the UTSA (“generally known” and “readily ascertainable”).
80 See id. at art. 10.
81 See id. at art. 11.
82 See UTSA, supra note 18, § 1 (4).
77
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in the 1993 AUCL. Article 12 considered independent development
and reverse engineering as non-infringing conduct, which reflected
the common defenses put forward by defendants in local cases. 83
This limitation is widely accepted in other countries as well84 and is
arguably rooted in article 39 of TRIPS.85 In this sense, not only did
the 2007 Judicial Interpretation not add any stricter rules to the
regime, but it even put a limitation on the protection, based on
internationally accepted standards.
To summarize, during this development phase, the trade
secrets protection regime was enhanced from mere contractual
protection to property-like protection in the 1993 AUCL, mainly
because of the US influence rather than due to local industry’s needs
or local academic support. The substantial framework for trade
secrets protection in the 1993 AUCL was also hugely affected by the
US. The 1995 Administrative Regulation and 2007 Judicial
Interpretation, though promulgated without explicit US pressure, did
not increase the legislative protection level any further, but mainly
added some details to the regime to help with the enforcement. The
perceived enhancement of the legislative protection level of trade
secrets during this phase is mainly attributable to the US influence.
C.

2012 to 2017

Starting in 2012, trade secrets protection issues in China have
been consistently addressed in the Special 301 reports, perhaps
because of the US’ increasing awareness of trade secrets’ importance
for US companies and the US economy. 86 Apart from the Special
301 Reports, China and the US also increased their bilateral
exchanges on trade secret issues in the 24th to 27th U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), 87 during which China
83 See 2007 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 78, at art. 12; Jiang Zhipei (蒋志培) et
al., Guanyu Shenli Buzhengdang Jingzheng Minshi Anjian Yingyong Falv Ruogan Wenti de
Jieshi de Lijie yu Shiyong (《关于审理不正当竞争民事案件应用法律若干问题的解释》
的理解与适用) [The Understanding and Application of the 2007 Judicial Interpretation on
Anti-Unfair Competition Law], FALV SHIYONG (LEGAL APPLICATION), no. 3, 2007, at 27.
84 See, e.g., UTSA, supra note 18, comment of § 1.
85 See Sandeen, supra note 67, at 560–61.
86 See, e.g., 2013 Special 301 Report, supra note 7, at 13–14.
87 The U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), established in
1983, is the main forum for addressing bilateral trade matters and promoting commercial
opportunities between the United States and China. The JCCT also includes 16 active
working groups covering a wide variety of issues and industries including, intellectual
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made many commitments to enhance the country’s trade secrets
protection regime.88 Such pressures from the Special 301 process and
the commitments made in the JCCT triggered China’s further
enhancements of trade secrets protection in the legislation.
The Special 301 Reports from 2012 to 2017 identified various
deficiencies in China’s 1993 AUCL with regard to trade secrets
protection, and urged China to revise its AUCL to provide more
adequate protection for trade secrets. 89 The 2016 and 2017 Special
301 Reports further urged China to consider a standalone trade secrets
law, despite the fact that China had put much effort into reforming
the 1993 AUCL then.90 Specific problems of the trade secrets
protection regime in the 1993 AUCL identified by these reports
included limiting the scope of trade secrets by requiring information
to have practical applicability, 91 limiting the law’s application
property, environment, information industry, pharmaceutical and medical devices, statistics,
commercial law, and trade and investment, among others. See Trade Policy Initiatives: U.S.–
China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), Export.gov (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://2016.export.gov/china/doingbizinchina/tradepolicydialog/eg_cn_026540.asp
[https://perma.cc/Y6KV-F7JS].
88 See, e.g., 24th U.S.–China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade Fact Sheet,
USTR (Dec. 20, 2013), https://ustr.gov/index.php/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/factsheets/2013/December/JCCT-outcomes [https://perma.cc/7A28-58UH] (hereinafter 24th
JCCT Fact Sheet); U.S.-China Joint Fact Sheet on the 25th U.S.-China Joint Commission
on Commerce and Trade, USTR (Dec. 30, 2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/fact-sheets/2014/december/us-china-joint-fact-sheet-25th-us
[https://perma.cc/M6Y9-WDDX] [hereinafter 25th JCCT Fact Sheet].
89 See 2013 Special 301 Report, supra note 7, at 31–33 (“Enforcement obstacles include
various deficiencies in China’s Anti Unfair Competition Law”); U.S. Trade Representative,
2014
Special
301
Report
31-32
(May
2013),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%202014%20Special%20301%20Report%20to%2
0Congress%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X87-NDYZ] [hereinafter 2014 Special 301
Report] (“Amendment of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL), unrevised since first
entering into force in 1993, is proceeding at a slower pace . . . the United States notes the
need to move forward expeditiously with remaining revisions to its IP related laws, and
underscores the urgent need to update and amend the AUCL and related trade secret laws,
regulations, and judicial interpretations, including provisions regarding the protection and
enforcement of trade secrets.”); 2015 Special 301 Report, supra note 42, at 32 (“The United
States underscores the urgent need to update and amend the AUCL and related trade secret
laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations.”)
90 See 2017 Special 301 Report, supra note 42, at 30 (“to date, China has not signaled
an intention to develop the standalone legislation that would best remedy concerns”); 2016
Special 301 Report, supra note 30, at 30 (“The United States urges China to consider drafting
a stand-alone trade secrets law, which would provide an opportunity to address a broader
range of concerns than possible as part of a reform to the AUCL.”)
91 See, e.g., 2014 Special 301 Report, supra note 89, at 32–33; 2015 Special 301 Report,
supra note 42, at 36.
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because AUCL appeared to apply primarily to commercial
undertakings (business operators) rather than individual actors,92 low
damage awards for trade secret holders in infringement cases, 93 and
lack of preliminary injunctions in trade secrets cases. 94 Perhaps
because of these Special 301 reports, China committed to providing
a stronger trade secrets protection regime in several bilateral
exchanges with the US through the JCCT. 95 The commitments made
by China included clarifying rules on preliminary injunctions or
evidence preservation, 96 confirming that trade secrets in practice may
be misappropriated by individual actors such as employees who are
not commercial undertakings, 97 and agreeing to strengthen the
protection of trade secrets in government proceedings.98
The pressures from the Special 301 Reports and China’s
commitments in JCCT gave rise to the amendments to the trade
secrets provisions in the 1993 AUCL. The 1993 AUCL was,
accordingly, revised on November 4, 2017, and came into effect on
January 1, 2018 (hereinafter 2017 AUCL).99 There were four notable
amendments to the trade secrets protection regime in the 2017 AUCL.
First, the practical applicability requirement was deleted from article
9 of the 2017 AUCL, which extended the scope of the information
protected by trade secrets and was consistent with TRIPS’
requirements regarding trade secrets. 100 Second, the 2017 AUCL
92 See, e.g., 2014 Special 301 Report, supra note 89, at 32–33; 2015 Special 301 Report,
supra note 42, at 36.
93 See, e.g., 2016 Special 301 Report, supra note 30, at 30.
94 See, e.g., id.; 2017 Special 301 Report, supra note 42, at 30.
95 See, e.g., 24th JCCT Fact Sheet, supra note 88; 25th JCCT Fact Sheet, supra note
88.
96 See U.S.-China Joint Fact Sheet on the 26th U.S.-China Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade, USTR (Dec. 21, 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/fact-sheets/2015/December/US-China-Joint-Fact-Sheet-26th-JCCT
[https://perma.cc/GQ2F-VACN] [hereinafter 26th JCCT Fact Sheet]; U.S.-China Joint Fact
Sheet on the 27th U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, USTR (Jan. 9,
2017),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2017/january/uschina-joint-fact-sheet-27th-us [https://perma.cc/7D5S-VDDK] [hereinafter 27th JCCT Fact
Sheet].
97
See 27th JCCT Fact Sheet, supra note 96.
98 See 25th JCCT Fact Sheet, supra note 88.
99 Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (反不正当竞争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law],
(promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1,
1993; revised by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 4, 2017, effective Jan. 1,
2018), CLI.1.304262(EN) (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter 2017 AUCL].
100 See id. at art. 9; King & Wood Mallesons, Amendment to China’s Anti-Unfair
Competition Law, CHINA L. INSIGHT, at Part 6 (Nov. 14, 2017),
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increased the damage awarded to trade secrets holders, in that article
17 raised the cap on statutory damage from RMB 1 million to RMB
3 million.101 Such statutory damage is awarded at the court’s
discretion when the actual losses sustained by the right holders or the
gains obtained by the infringer are difficult to determine. 102 Third,
satisfying the commitments made in JCCT, the 2017 AUCL
specifically added article 15 to impose a confidentiality duty on
government officials, requiring them to keep confidential any trade
secrets divulged in administrative proceedings.103 Fourth, article 9
added that if third parties know or should have known of the
misappropriation by an employee or a former employee or any other
entity or individual, they may be deemed as infringing trade secrets
if they still acquire, disclose, use, or allow others to use the trade
secrets.104 The emphasis on “an employee or a former employee” in
article 9 can be construed as partly responding to the criticism that
the AUCL only applies to “business operators” rather than
individuals. However, this emphasis did not fully clarify the question
of whether the AUCL could apply to individuals. In sum, we can see
that the first three changes of trade secrets protection in the 2017
AUCL were either in response to US criticism in the Special 301
Reports or meeting the commitments made by China in its bilateral
exchanges with the US. In other words, China added all these stricter
rules into its regime under US influence to further enhance the
legislative protection level. While the last change in the 2017 AUCL
did not explicitly respond to US criticism, it also did not enhance the
protection level. This change was arguably just to emphasize the
importance of dealing with a certain type of case, by making it
explicit in the legislation, wherein third parties acquired trade secrets
from employees. We can say that this change gave more clarity to
https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2017/11/articles/intellectual-property/amendment-tochinas-anti-unfair-competition-law [https://perma.cc/Y8RC-DBS6].
101 See id. at art. 17 ¶ 4; Ruixun Ran, et al., Trade Secret Law In China: 3 Highlights
From 2017, LAW 360, 1, 2 (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2018/01/trade_secret_law_in_china_3_highlights_from
_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AV7-DA62].
102 See Ran et al., supra note 101, at 2.
103 See 2017 AUCL, supra note 99, at art. 15.
104 See 2017 AUCL, supra note 99, at art. 9 (“Where a third party knows or should have
known that an employee or a former employee of the right holder of a trade secret or any
other entity or individual has committed an illegal act as specified in the preceding paragraph
but still acquires, discloses, uses, or allows another person to use the trade secrets, the third
party shall be deemed to have infringed the trade secret.” (emphasis added)).
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the regime, but not that it substantially provided stricter rules for
protecting employers’ trade secrets. 105
Moreover, to respond to the criticism concerning lack of
preliminary injunctions in trade secrets cases, in early 2015 the
Supreme People’s Court of China (SPC) invited comments for the
draft of “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues
concerning the Application of Law in Cases Involving the Review of
Act Preservation in Intellectual Property Disputes,” which was finally
promulgated in 2018.106 This judicial interpretation provided a legal
basis for right holders to apply for preliminary injunctions or
evidence preservation if they believe their trade secrets are being
infringed.107 The courts have been invested with the authority to issue
such preliminary rulings upon application, based on this judicial
interpretation.108
To conclude, the 2017 AUCL and 2018 Judicial Interpretation
made certain amendments or additions to the trade secrets protection
regime in China, which enhanced the legislative level of protection
for trade secrets, making it much stricter than before. However, not
only were all the enhancements triggered by the US, but also the
substance of these stricter protections was significantly influenced by
the US, either through its unilateral Special 301 process or through
its bilateral exchanges with China. China’s local industry’s needs
played a limited role, if any, in framing China’s protection regime.

105 See King & Wood Mallesons, supra note 100, at Part 6; see also Wen Zhong,
Amendments of Anti-Unfair Competition Law, LIU SHEN INTELL. PROP., at I. 1 (7), (Nov.
17, 2017), http://www.liu-shen.com/Content-2729.html [https://perma.cc/B9HV-X9CT].
106 For the draft for public comments, see SPC, Provisions of the Supreme People’s
Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in Cases Involving the Review
of Act Preservation in Intellectual Property Disputes (Draft for comments), SPC (Feb. 26,
2015), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-13517.html [https://perma.cc/AFH8K3BT]. For the final promulgated version, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shencha
Zhishi Chanquan Jiufen Xingwei Baoquan Anjian Shiyong Falv Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi ,
Fashi [2018] Ershi Yi Hao (最高人民法院关于审理知识产权纠纷行为保全案件适用法
律若干问题的解释, 法释 [2018] 21号) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on
Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in Cases Involving the Review of Act
Preservation in Intellectual Property Disputes, Judicial Interpretation No. 21 [2018]],
promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 12, 2018, effective Jan. 1, 2019), CLI.3.327340(EN)
(Lawinfochina) [hereinafter 2018 Judicial Interpretation].
107 See 2018 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 106, at arts. 2, 6.
108 See id. at arts 2, 13.
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2018 to date

The US government, however, was not satisfied with the
amendments in the 2017 AUCL with regard to trade secrets. The
2018 and 2019 Special 301 Reports identified the 2017 AUCL as “a
major missed opportunity to address critical concerns” in the trade
secrets protection regime. 109 The 2018 Report criticized China’s
failure to establish a standalone trade secrets law as it continues to
put important trade secret provisions in the AUCL.110 Specifically,
these two years’ reports criticized some problems in the 2017 AUCL,
such as “the overly narrow scope of covered actions and actors, the
failure to address obstacles to injunctive relief, and the need to allow
for evidentiary burden-shifting in appropriate circumstances.” 111 As
mentioned above, the problem of lack of preliminary injunctions had
been partly addressed by the 2018 Judicial Interpretation which went
into effect on January 1, 2019. 112 The USTR in the 2019 Special 301
Report admitted as much, although it was uncertain whether this
judicial interpretation could truly address the problem.113 From the
US government’s perspective, other concerns raised in the reports
were not resolved by China in 2017. Moreover, on March 22, 2018,
the USTR issued a report describing the acts, policies, and practices
that were “unreasonable or discriminatory and burden and/or restrict
U.S. commerce.”114 This report was the outcome of the investigation
under the Section 301 process initiated by the USTR in August 2017

109 U.S. Trade Representative, 2018 Special 301 Report 40 (Apr. 2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018%20Special%20301.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7G8J-98XB] [hereinafter 2018 Special 301 Report]; U.S. Trade
Representative,
2019
Special
301
Report
41–42
(Apr.
2019),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Special_301_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2FL8NUM] [hereinafter 2019 Special 301 Report].
110 See 2018 Special 301 Report, supra note 109, at 40.
111 See 2018 Special 301 Report, supra note 109, at 40; 2019 Special 301 Report, supra
note 109, at 42.
112
2018 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 106.
113 2019 Special 301 Report, supra note 109, at 42.
114 2018 Special 301 Report, supra note 109, at 17; U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301
OF
THE
TRADE
ACT
OF
1974
(Mar.
22,
2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/T3U77UVN] [hereinafter 2018 Investigation Report].
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to examine the IPR situation in China. 115 Trade secrets protection
issues were also discussed in this investigation report.116 This report
became the legal basis for US trade sanctions (increased tariffs)
against China in July 2018,117 in response to which China imposed
retaliatory tariffs on US exports in August 2018.118 Intense
negotiations between US and China started, following the release of
the report.119 IPR issues including trade secrets were major themes
for US–China negotiations during the trade war. 120 For example, the
official statement from the US after the US–China three-day trade
talks in Beijing on January 2019 mentioned “negotiations with a view
to achieving needed structural changes in China with respect to . . .
cyber theft of trade secrets for commercial purposes, services, and
agriculture.”121
In response to US concerns regarding trade secrets protection
in China as expressed in the Special 301 process and the trade war
negotiations, China amended its 2017 AUCL again in 2019.122 The
2019 AUCL mainly revised the trade secrets rules in the 2017
AUCL.123 One revision to the 2019 AUCL expanded the scope of
115 See 2018 Special 301 Report, supra note 109, at 17; see also 2018 Investigation
Report, supra note 114, at 4.
116 See 2018 Investigation Report, supra note 114, at 171–76, 179–80.
117 See Karen Yeung & Sidney Leng, Can China Meet US Trade War Demands on IP
Theft and Forced Technology Transfer?, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 25, 2019, 6:00
AM),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2187312/us-china-tradewar-can-china-meet-us-demands-ip-theft-and [https://perma.cc/A4LJ-WYR6]; see also
Dorcas Wong & Alexander Chipman Koty, The US-China Trade War: A Timeline, CHINA
BRIEFING (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-atimeline [https://perma.cc/JF9W-JJK9].
118 See Wong & Koty, supra note 117.
119 See id. (demonstrating the on and off trade negotiations between the US and China
that occurred between August 22, 2018 and November 9, 2018).
120 See Yeung & Leng, supra note 117; See also Gu Ping (顾萍) & Liu Xingyu (刘騂
宇), China Amended IP Laws & Regulations to Strengthen IPR Protection, ZHONG LUN
(May 13, 2019), http://www.zhonglun.com/Content/2019/05-13/0937561797.html
[https://perma.cc/J82U-UYCF].
121 U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on the United States Trade Delegation’s
Meetings in Beijing, USTR Press Release (Jan. 9, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2019/january/statement-united-states-trade
[https://perma.cc/WD8E-BPHR].
122 See Ping & Xingyu, supra note 120.
123 See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuan Hui Zuochu Xiugai
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanbuzhengdang Jingzheng Fa de Jueding (全国人民代表
大会常务委员会做出修改《中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法》的决定) [The Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress made a decision to amend the “People’s
Republic of China Anti-Unfair Competition Law], Guojia Shichang Jiandu Guanli Zongju
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Article 9 to include individuals and other entities as potential
infringers of trade secrets.124 This addition makes clear that the trade
secrets protections in the 2019 AUCL not only apply to commercial
undertakings but also to individual actors and other entities,
responding to US concerns that the AUCL restricted its application
only to commercial undertakings. Another change in Article 9 was
addressing the cyber theft of trade secrets by adding a new type of
trade secrets misappropriation—namely, the acquisition of trade
secrets through cyber invasion. 125 This change clearly reacted to the
concerns of the US about cyber theft of trade secrets as reflected in
its trade negotiations with China. 126 One other amendment to the
2019 AUCL again targeted the damage award to trade secrets holders
in infringement cases. Article 17 of the 2019 AUCL allows granting
right holders punitive damages against trade secret infringement if
such misappropriation is carried out with malicious intent. 127
Moreover, the statutory damages was increased from 3 million RMB
to 5 million RMB,128 shortly after its first increase in the 2017 AUCL
under the Special 301 process. Lastly importantly, China finally
adhered to the US’ consistent demand to allow the burden of proof
shifting in some trade secrets infringement. Before the 2019 AUCL,
plaintiffs had to prove every element of their claim such that the
(国家市场监督管理总局) [STATE ADMIN FOR MKT. REGUL.] (Apr. 25, 2019),
http://www.huzhou.gov.cn/hzgov/front/s72/xxgk/zcwj/20191010/i2516950.html
[https://perma.cc/UR3P-TR2D] (all the amendments are related to trade secrets); see also id.
124 See 2019 AUCL, supra note 1, at art. 9 ¶6 (“An illegal act as set forth in the preceding
paragraph committed by a natural person, legal person or unincorporated organization other
than a business shall be treated as infringement of the trade secret.”); see also Steven Grimes,
China Revises Anti-Unfair Competition Law to Further Enhance Trade Secret Protection,
WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (May 13, 2019), https://www.winston.com/en/privacy-lawcorner/china-revises-anti-unfair-competition-law-to-further-enhance-trade-secretprotection.html [https://perma.cc/EY88-YHH8].
125 See 2019 AUCL, supra note 1, at art. 9 ¶2 (“(1) Acquiring a trade secret from the
right holder by theft, bribery, fraud, coercion, electronic intrusion, or any other illicit
means.” [emphasis added]); see also Global Legal Monitor, China: Trade Secret Provisions
Under Anti-Unfair Competition Law Revised, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (June 6, 2019),
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-trade-secret-provisions-under-antiunfair-competition-law-revised [https://perma.cc/9LM9-BNAD].
126 See supra text accompanying note 121.
127 This allows plaintiffs to recover up to five times the loss suffered. See 2019 AUCL,
supra note 1, at art. 17 ¶3 (“If a business infringes upon a trade secret in bad faith with
serious circumstances, the amount of compensation may be determined to be more than one
time but not more than five times the amount determined by the aforesaid method.”); See
also Grimes, supra note 124.
128 See 2019 AUCL, supra note 1, at art. 17 ¶4.
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information satisfied all requirements of trade secrets and had been
misappropriated by the defendants.129 The legislation then did not
recognize any shifting of the burden of proof, which was alleged to
have made trade secret infringement claims hard to prove.130 The
2019 AUCL Article 32 permits evidentiary burden-shifting in several
situations. First , Article 32 shifts the burden to the defendant to
prove that the litigated information is not a trade secret, if the plaintiff
provides prima facie evidence that they have taken reasonable
measures to protect the trade secret and reasonably shows that the
trade secret has been infringed. 131 Moreover, the burden of proof is
also shifted to the defendant to prove there is no infringement of trade
secrets if plaintiff provides prima facie evidence to reasonably
indicate the infringement of trade secrets, and provides evidence the
particular circumstances Article 32. 132 Examples of such particular
circumstances include situations where an alleged infringer has the
opportunity to gain access to the trade secrets, while the information
used by them is materially similar to the trade secrets, and the trade
secrets have been or risk being disclosed or used . 133 All these added
stricter rules in the 2019 AUCL were responding to US pressure
through the Special 301 process and trade war negotiations. Most
suggestions from the US about how to increase the trade secret level
were again adopted by China.
Even the 2019 AUCL with other amended IP laws did not
bring the US–China trade war to an end 134 and the negotiations
between the two countries to reach an agreement continued. After
many rounds of negotiations and back-and-forth to tariffs, the two
parties signed the Phase One Agreement on January 15, 2020, which
129

See 2007 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 78, at art. 14; William Fisher, Horace
Lam, Ting Xiao & Reking Chen, China’s Long-Awaited Overhaul of Trade Secret
Protection
Regime,
DLA
PIPER
(Apr.
26,
2019),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/china/insights/publications/2019/04/china-s-long-awaitedoverhaul [https://perma.cc/XL3S-GW7R]; see also Grimes, supra note 124.
130 See 2018 Special 301 Report, supra note 109, at 40; see also Fisher et al., supra note
129.
131 See 2019 AUCL, supra note 1, at art. 32 ¶1.
132
See id. at art. 32 ¶2.
133 See id. at art. 32 ¶3 (“(1) Evidence that the alleged tortfeasor has a channel or an
opportunity to access the trade secret and that the information it uses is substantially the
same as the trade secret. (2) Evidence that the trade secret has been disclosed or used, or is
at risk of disclosure or use, by the alleged tortfeasor. (3) Evidence that the trade secret is
otherwise infringed upon by the alleged tortfeasor.”).
134 Although China enhanced its IPR regime by amending several IP related laws, the
trade war between the US and China still continued. See Yeung & Leng, supra note 117.
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partly dealt with strengthening trade secrets protections. 135 Firstly,
Section B of the Phase One Agreement provides a broad definition of
confidential business information which includes nearly all
information as long as it satisfies the statutory requirements. 136 This
means China should enhance its protections to include such broad
scope of information in trade secrets. In response, the 2020 Judicial
Interpretation (Articles 1 and 2) and 2020 Administrative Regulation
(Draft) (Article 5) provide examples of the scope of trade secrets
covered by the AUCL.137 These examples represent the broad
definition of trade secrets, adopted by the Phase One Agreement. For
instance, style of works, business transactions, customer information,
amount or source of any income, profits, or other information of
commercial value can be regarded as trade secrets in the AUCL
according to the 2020 Judicial Interpretation. 138 Secondly, Article 1.3
of the Phase One Agreement requires China to expand its scope of
actors liable for trade secrets misappropriation to “include all natural
persons, groups of persons, and legal persons”139, apart from
commercial undertakings or business operators. The 2019 AUCL, as
mentioned above, has substantially expanded the scope of actors by
adding paragraph 3 to Article 9, 140 and thus satisfies the Article 1.3
requirement in the Phase One Agreement. Article 16 and Article 3
from the 2020 Interpretation and 2020 Administrative Regulation
(draft) respectively, further confirm that a natural person, legal
person, or unincorporated organization other than business operators

135

See Wong & Koty, supra note 117.
See Phase One agreement, supra note 11, at footnote 1 of 1-1 (stating that
“confidential business information” includes any “information of commercial value” that
could cause “substantial harm to the competitive position of such person from which the
information was obtained”).
137 See 2020 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 1, at art. 1 and 2; see also 2020
Administrative Regulation (Draft), supra note 1, at art. 5.
138 See 2020 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 1, at art. 1 (“A people’s court may
determine . . . styles . . . processes, methods or their steps, . . . data, computer programs and
their related documents, . . . as technical information in paragraph 4, article 9 of the AUCL.”,
“A people’s court may determine the information on . . . finance, plans, . . . ,clients’
information . . . as business information in paragraph 4, article 9 of the AUCL.” ); see also
2020 Administrative Regulation (Draft), supra note 1, at art. 5 (“design, procedures,
formulas, . . . , production processes . . . .”, “customer lists, . . . , financial data, . . . purchase
prices . . . .”).
139 See Phase One agreement, supra note 11, at art. 1.3.2.
140 See supra text accompanying note 124.
136
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can be deemed to be an infringer in the AUCL.141 The current
enhanced trade secrets protection regime thus fully satisfies Article
1.3 of the Phase One Agreement. Likewise, the scope of prohibited
acts constituting trade secret misappropriation, including “electronic
intrusions” (cyber threat), as required by Article 1.4 of the Phase One
Agreement, has mostly been covered by the 2019 AUCL.142
Specifically, Article 1.4.2 (c) in the Phase One Agreement requires
China to enumerate any act of “unauthorized disclosure or use that
occurs after the acquisition of a trade secret under circumstances
giving rise to a duty to protect the trade secret from disclosure or to
limit the use of the trade secret.” 143 In contrast to Article 1.4.2 (b)
which deals with situations when there is an explicit duty not to
disclose, Article 1.4.2 (c) covers situations where there is no explicit
duty but an implied duty that has arisen on account of certain
circumstances.144 In response, paragraph one of Article 10 in the
2020 Judicial Interpretation interprets what amounts to “a duty not to
disclose information” in the 2019 AUCL, satisfying article 1.4.2(b)
of the Phase One Agreement. 145 Meanwhile, paragraph two of Article
10 gives guidance for courts on how to determine whether there is an
implied duty not to disclose in certain circumstances, responding to
Article 1.4.2(c) of the Phase One Agreement. 146 Accordingly, we
may say that the Article 1.4 requirement in the Phase One Agreement
has been satisfied by China through the insertion of certain stricter
rules into the protection regime.
Fourthly, with regard to the burden-shifting stipulated in
Article 1.5 of the Phase One Agreement, 147 the 2019 AUCL similarly
141 See 2020 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 1, at art. 16; see also 2020
Administrative Regulation (Draft), supra note 1, at art. 3.
142 Phase One agreement, supra note 11, at art. 1.4; See supra text accompanying note
125.
143 See Phase One agreement, supra note 11, at art. 1.4.2(c).
144 See id. at art. 1.4.2(b).
145 See 2020 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 1, at art. 10 ¶ 1 (“The people’s court
shall determine the confidentiality obligation assumed by a party in accordance with legal
provisions or those agreed upon in a contract as a confidentiality obligation set forth in
paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.”).
146 See id.1, at art. 10 ¶ 2 (“Where the parties have not agreed on the confidentiality
obligation in their contract, but the alleged infringer knows or should have known that the
information obtained by it or him belongs to the trade secret of the right holder according to
the principle of good faith and the contract nature, purpose, conclusion process, and trading
practices, among others, the people’s court shall determine that the alleged infringer shall
assume the obligation to keep confidential the trade secret obtained by it or him.”).
147 See Phase One agreement, supra note 11, at art. 1.5.
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deferred to US pressure by including situations when the burden of
proof will be shifted to the defendant, 148 satisfying the Phase One
Agreement. The 2020 Judicial Interpretation provides further
instructions on what factors the court can take into consideration
when determining whether the used information is materially the
same as the trade secrets, supplementing the burden-shifting
provisions in the 2019 AUCL.149 The promises made by China in
article 1.5 of the Phase One Agreement have been satisfied by the
2019 AUCL and the 2020 Judicial Interpretation. Lastly, allowing
provisional measures or preliminary injunctions to prevent the use of
trade secrets is addressed in article 1.6 of the Phase One
Agreement.150 Fulfilling this commitment, the 2020 Judicial
Interpretation grants courts the authority in paragraph 1 of article 15
to take provisional measures to prevent the disclosure or use of trade
secrets, while paragraph 2 deals with “urgent situations” by issuing
provisional measures.151 This article meets the requirements in the
Phase One Agreement. Other provisions in the 2020 Judicial
Interpretation and 2020 Administrative Regulation (Draft) clarify the
current protection regime or add details to the original regime to some
degree without adding any stricter doctrines or changing the current
rules.152 For example, articles 3 and 4 of the 2020 Judicial
Interpretation clarify the requirement of secrecy by defining the
meaning of “not known to the public” and provides some examples,
without adding new requirements to the regime set up by the
AUCL.153 In sum, under the influence of the Phase One Agreement,
namely the US influence, the 2020 Judicial Interpretation and 2020
Administrative Regulation (Draft) added stricter rules to the trade
148 See supra text accompanying notes 129-133 (emphasizing situations where burden
shifting is permitted).
149 2020 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 1, at art. 13.
150 Phase One Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 1.6.
151 See 2020 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 1, at art. 15 ¶¶ 1–2 (responding to the
articles 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 of the Phase One Agreement).
152 See Zhong Lun Law Firm, Overview of the PRC New Judicial Interpretation on Civil
Enforcement
of
Trade
Secret,
LEXOLOGY
(Sept.
21,
2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=86773741-10df-426c-9b4b-0abe9f5e971b
[https://perma.cc/PW3K-ZCCY] (containing a brief summary of the provisions of the 2020
Judicial Interpretation). See Sofia Baruzzi, Trade Secrets’ Protection in China: What is
Changing?, CHINA BRIEFING (Sept 21, 2020), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/tradesecrets-protection-in-china-changes-expected/ [https://perma.cc/U7S7-Q2E8] (containing a
brief summary of the provisions of the 2020 Administrative Regulation (Draft)).
153 2020 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 1, at arts. 3–4.
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secrets protection regime, which have further enhanced the legislative
protection level in China.
E.

Summary

The above analysis shows that ever since China has
established its trade secrets protection regime through the AUCL,
most further enhancements of trade secret legislative protection level
in China have been significantly influenced by the US through its
unilateral Special 301 Process, its bilateral exchanges with China, and
its bilateral agreements with China (please see Table 1 for a summary
of developments). In other words, the US has pushed China to
increase the legislative protection level for trade secrets, and
substantially affected, in substance, what stricter rules China has
added to the regime nearly every time. Although China itself has
added many details and clarifications to the regime by summarizing
and synthesizing the lessons learned in practice, most of them do not
substantially make the system stricter. It is, thus, argued that most
enhancements of the legislative protection level and the s stricter rules
added can be majorly attributed to the US influence rather than to the
demands of local industry and academia. This development has
resulted in problems in the current trade secrets protection regime in
China, both in theory and in practice.

III.

CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT PATH

The preceding part shows that every new, stricter rule that
advanced the legislative protection level was triggered by and
followed the suggestions put forward by the US through the Special
301 Process or bilateral exchanges or bilateral agreements. What is
interesting, however, is whether the local industry truly needs this
strict regime; if not, what interests, other than that of the local
industry, does the current regime mainly account for, and why so.
Additionally, what impacts do this development path and the
resultant regime have on the local academia? This part of the paper
focuses on these questions to explore the consequences of this
development path for the local industry and local academia.
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A.

Insufficient Consideration of Local Industry Interests and
Needs

One notable consequence of such a development route is that
the current protection regime does not sufficiently account for local
industry interests, which harms the growth of the local industry. To
present this consequence, this sub-part first discusses whether the
local industry truly has a practical need for such an enhanced
legislative protection regime as demanded by the US. If not, why are
local industry interests and needs neglected in this regime? The main
reason is that the US industry functions collaboratively to promote
and represent their interests in enhancing trade secrets protection in
China. As may be recalled, the main frameworks of how to increase
the legislative protection level (by adding stricter rules) have been
significantly influenced or even set up by the US influence. The
subsequent section, however, shows that the perceived US influence
is indeed the US industry influence because these main frameworks
of the stricter rules added are actually provided and promoted by US
industry through the statutory procedure allowed in the Special 301
process. Such extensive representation of the interests of the US
industry in China’s legal amendments to the trade secrets protection
regime leaves little room for China to account for local industry’s
needs. This furthers the argument that local industry’s interests have
been harmed significantly by this strict regime when the interests of
US industry conflict with those of local industry.
1.

Does Local Industry Really Need Such Enhanced
Protection?

Before we discuss this question in detail, regarding the local
industry’s needs, let us first consider the main policy goals of trade
secrets. By extending trade secrets protection beyond mere
contractual protection to prevent misappropriation by parties with the
duty of confidence and even third parties, modern trade secrets law
mainly intends to serve a policy goal similar to that of patents and
copyright—incentivizing
invention/creation. 154
Valuable
154 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 17, at 262–70; Lemley, supra note 19, at 329–32; Deepa
Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1418–20 (2014); Peter S.
Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 15 (2017); PETER SETH. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL
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information that is subject to trade secrets protection suffers similar
public good problems as matters of patent and copyright since such
information is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. 155 The public good
nature of information means that, without any legal protection, the
valuable information that companies put much investment into
creating may be freely used by others, especially their competitors,
causing free-rider problems.156 It is argued that, when faced with
free-rider problems, companies may reduce their investment in
creating valuable information, which is not socially desirable. 157 To
reduce these public goods and free-rider problems, trade secrets law
functions to give the developer a limited exclusive right to control the
valuable information they put efforts into, and by conferring a right
to exclude other users, it gives the developer the possibility of
“deriving supracompetitive profits from the information.” 158 In this
sense, by giving certain rewards to the developers of the information,
trade secrets law is argued to encourage innovation and creation. 159
Moreover, trade secrets law also gives companies an incentive to
invest in areas where patent law does not reach, as acknowledged in
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.160 One example of such areas is
information that is outside the scope of the patent subject matter, such
as “negative know-how” information.161 Another example is
valuable information in fast-moving industries, where the long
waiting period to secure patent protection makes patents an
impractical choice. 162 The protection offered by trade secrets law in
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 76–77 (2019) (arguing that modern trade secret
law aims at incentivizing invention and creation).
155 See Varadarajan, supra note 154, at 1413; Lemley, supra note 19, at 329–30; Bone,
supra note 17, at 262 (all explaining that because information is nonrivalrous and
nonexcludable, it is subject to trade secrets protection as patents and copyrights).
156 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 17, at 262–63, 264 (explaining that market may do a poor
job to incentivize companies to make investment in creation because of the free-rider
problem).
157 See id.
158 Lemley, supra note 19, at 330.
159 Id.
160 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484–85 (1974) (“Trade secret law
will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the
independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention.
Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite
patentable, invention.”). See also Varadarajan, supra note 154, at 1418–19 (reviewing this
case).
161 Lemley, supra note 19, at 331 (stating that the Supreme Court identified the
incentive-to-invent justification as a key purpose of trade secret law).
162 Id.
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areas where patent protections are absent or impractical gives
companies an additional incentive to innovate or invest in those areas.
However, giving companies an exclusive right over
information, whether limited or absolute, always comes with social
costs. One significant cost is its negative influence on the public use
of information because exclusive rights naturally limit the
dissemination of information to the public, which results in higher
costs in innovation based on prior information (namely, cumulative
innovation).163 To curb the accompanying social costs, both patents
and copyright adopt certain mechanisms to foster the public use of
such information or works. All patents and copyrights are limited in
scope and duration, allowing second-comers to freely use any
materials beyond such duration and scope. 164 Additionally, patents
application requires public disclosure of claims and the written
descriptions, which allows others to innovate around the disclosed
information.165 Though copyright law does not have similar
disclosure requirements, it imposes another equally strong ex post
limitation—fair use doctrine, allowing free use of prior works if
deemed fair.166 All these mechanisms function to reduce social costs
caused by exclusive rights, by promoting cumulative innovation.
Nevertheless, there is no effective mechanism available in trade
secrets law to reduce the social costs. Trade secrets can last
indefinitely as long as they are kept secret, and such secrecy
requirements conceal information from the public, which limits or
even prevents cumulative innovation. On the other hand, as Professor
Lemley argues, trade secrets law actually incentivizes disclosure
because trade secrets protection can facilitate holders to share trade
secrets with others in precontractual negotiations.167 Without
protections, the information holders may require the counterparty to
sign a confidentiality agreement first before disclosing, while the
163 See Varadarajan, supra note 154, at 1413; Bone, supra note 17, at 263 (both arguing
that exclusive rights should be limited to avoid social costs).
164 See Varadarajan, supra note 154, at 1413 (arguing that patents and copyrights are
limited in scope and duration to allow others to freely use protected works once intellectual
property rights have expired).
165 See id. at 1409–10 (reviewing the claim and written documents the inventor needs to
submit to PTO).
166 See id. at 1427–30; see generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair
Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (acknowledging that fair use doctrine is important
in copyright law and arguing for a clear standard).
167 Lemley, supra note 19, at 336–37.
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counterparty may feel reluctant to sign such an agreement without
knowing and evaluating the information (the so-called Arrow’s
Information Paradox).168 This paradox may lead to failure of
negotiations and information not being effectively disclosed to the
other party. Thus, according to Professor Lemley, trade secrets,
through promoting disclosure in negotiations, facilitate the
commercialization of the information. 169 However, such disclosure
only between licensing parties is not the type of public disclosure that
allows the public to use the information in cumulative innovations. 170
It cannot reduce the social costs imposed by the exclusive rights
restricting cumulative innovation. With regard to current limits in
trade secrets, although reverse engineering and independent
development defenses limit trade secrets protection, both increase the
costs for firms in obtaining and innovating around the information
and encourage firms to make wasteful investments, 171 which do not
facilitate cumulative innovation but somehow impede it.
Additionally, the reverse engineering defense is increasingly being
contracted out by firms, the validity of which has been accepted by
courts, making this defense less effective. 172 These two limits fail to
curb the harm trade secrets cause to cumulative innovation. Given
this scenario, due to trade secret law’s lack of effective mechanisms
for the limitation, it is naturally more prone than patents and
copyright to negatively affect cumulative innovation, which is not
beneficial to the development of the industry. In other words, the
current strict trade secrets law without adequate limiting mechanisms
may have already impeded cumulative innovation within the
industry, causing significant social costs.
The situation is even worse when we take the practices in the
US industry into consideration. While the overly restrictive trade
secrets law without effective limiting doctrines may itself greatly
impede industrial innovations, in the employment context, the
confounding effect of the non-compete clauses further restricts
168

Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
170 See Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1803, 1818 (2014) (explaining that trade secret licensing limit the goal for the public
to use the disclosed information).
171 Bone, supra note 17 at 269.
172 See Deepa Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-Contract Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV.
1543, 1568–70 (2018) (explaining that courts have become increasingly accepting of reverse
engineering restrictions and encourage firms to contract out of the defense).
169
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cumulative innovations. Specifically, a strict trade secrets law and
the non-compete clauses both function to limit employee mobility,
which is acknowledged as potentially the reason for Silicon Valley’s
success.173 The non-compete clauses can even facilitate the
enforcement of trade secrets since many courts consider protecting
trade secrets as the primary justification for recognizing non-compete
covenants.174 With strict trade secrets protection and non-compete
clauses in hand, employers especially large companies can easily use
litigation threats to deter employees from even lawfully moving to
another company or sharing information, which restricts even lawful
competition and frustrates cumulative innovation.175 A former
employee may be prevented from “working on the precise line of
research they know best” forever, or at least for a certain period,
which may be the best time for innovations.176 US practitioners have
already realized the negative effect of strict trade secrets rules and
non-compete clauses on the growth of the industry and have called
for a less restrictive regime in these areas of the law. 177 US scholars
have also been increasingly focusing on adding limiting doctrines to
the trade secrets regime to alleviate the current strict regime’s harmful
effect on US industry’s development. 178
Even as the development of US industry suffers from such
strict trade secrets law and the wide use of non-compete agreements,
triggering practitioners and scholars to argue for a less restrict regime,
China under US pressure is anyway adopting similar strict trade
173 See Charles Tait Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict Trade Secret and NonCompetition Laws Obstruct Innovation, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 323, 325–26 (2006)
(stating that California has barred the use of non-competition agreements in 1872. This is
said to increase the employee mobility for employees to more easily move from company to
company and apply the knowledge they developed along the way).
174 Varadarajan, supra note 172, at 1572.
175 See Graves & DiBoise, supra note 173, at 337–38 (arguing that big companies might
use trade secret litigations to deter employees to move to a new company or share
information).
176 Joseph P. Fishman & Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1051,
1056 (2019).
177
See, e.g., Graves & DiBoise, supra note 173, at 323–25 (arguing abandoning rigid
restrictions on the trade secret rules and non-complete clauses).
178 See, e.g., Camilla Alexandra Hrdy & Mark A. Lemley, Abandoning Trade Secrets,
73
STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3534322
[https://perma.cc/5DS7-YVDZ] (arguing trade secrets can be abandoned); Varadarajan,
supra note 154 (arguing adding fair use doctrine into trade secrets law); Menell, supra note
154 (arguing adding a public policy exception); Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 176
(arguing allowing use of trade secrets in the process to produce different ends).
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secrets protections as the US and generally recognizes the validity of
non-compete clauses.
Although empirical studies in China
examining the trade secrets protection level are very limited, one such
study in 2019 examined the legislative protection level in the
legislation from 1993 to 2013 by using 6 factors (Trade secrets
requirements, international conventions attended, a period of
protection, limiting doctrines such as reverse engineering,
enforcement tools such as injunctions and burden of proof, noncompete agreements). 179
The study concluded that China’s
legislative protection level in 2013 has achieved international
standards.180 Our prior analysis reveals that, after 2013, the trade
secrets legislative protection level has been consistently increased in
2017, 2019, and 2020 under US pressure. We can infer that the
current legislative protection level in China has been above the
international standards and it is perhaps even quite similar to the US
legislative protection level, as the amendments after 2013 have all
substantially followed the US’ suggestions. Moreover, some even
argue that some of the current trade secrets rules in China actually
exceed the US protection level. For example, Professor Cui Guobin,
a well-known IP scholar in China, argues that the US law does not
generally allow shifting of the burden of proof in trade secrets cases,
but nevertheless the US still required China to insert burden-shifting
clauses into its regime anyway, which enhanced China’s protection
level in the legislation even above that of the US.181 This argument
is correct on the face of it, but the situation is actually much more
complicated. The argument from the US for burden-shifting in China
is that Chinese Civil Procedure Law does not have as effective a
discovery system as the US, making evidence for trade secrets cases
hard to obtain.182 Thus, it is arguable that the so-called “stricter” rules
on burden-shifting in China are to supplement the country’s weak
179 Wang Lina (王莉娜) & Zhang Guoping (张国平), Zhongguo Shangye Mimi Baohu
Shuiping de Dingliang Yanjiu (中国商业秘密保护水平的定量研究) [The Empirical Study
on the Production Level of Trade Secrets in China], KEYAN GUANLI (科研管理) [SCI. RSCH.
MGMT.], no.9, vol. 40, 2019, at 66.
180 Id. at 71.
181 Cui Guobin (崔国斌), Shangye Mimi Qinquan Susong de Juzheng Zeren Fenpei (商
业秘密侵权诉讼的举证责任分配) [Allocating Burden of Proof in Trade Secrets
Infringement Cases], JIAODA FAXUE (交大法学) [SJTU L. REV.], No. 4, 2020, at 11.
182 Thanks for Professor Victoria Cundiff for pointing out this practical consideration.
Prof. Victoria Cundiff is a partner at Paul Hastings with extensive experiences in trade
secrets litigation.
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discovery system. Besides, although there is no statutory burdenshifting clause in the US, some US courts nevertheless allow shifting
of the burden of persuasion on to the defendant when the plaintiff
proves that the defendant had access to the secrets and has produced
“a suspiciously similar product or process in a short time.” 183
Nevertheless, two local court judges in China argue that the new
burden shifting clauses alleviate the burden of trade secrets holders,
to an unjustifiable extent. 184 They claimed that, before the new
provision, the Chinese courts have already reduced holders’ burden
in proving trade secrets claims, especially in proving the secrecy
requirement.185 In this sense, they argue for interpreting the burden
shifting rules in a limited way to maintain a better balance between
interests.186
However, it is still fair to say that China now has adopted a
regime that is at least as strict as the one in the US. This is evidenced
by an element-by-element comparison between the US trade secrets
protection system and the Chinese system using the “Trade Secrets
Protection Index,” created by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 187 (please see Table 2 below for
a detailed comparison between the Chinese system and the US one
using the index). Through the element-by-element comparison, we
see that the Chinese trade secrets law, through its amendments in
2019 and new judicial interpretations, has been substantially similar
to the US law, except for the discovery system. Nevertheless, it can
be argued that the burden-shifting clauses, which are not generally
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Protecting trade secrets – recent EU
and US reforms, ICC 1, 22 (2019), https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2019/04/finalicc-report-protecting-trade-secrets.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG3D-MEXV]; see JAMES
POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 12.04 [2] (Law Journal Press ed. 2019) (listing example cases at
the footnote 54).
184 See Yu Zhiqiang (喻志强) & Ge Guangying (戈光应), Shangye Mimi Qinquan
Susong Juzheng Xinguize de Shiyong (商业秘密侵权诉讼举证新规则的适用) [The
Application of the New Evidence Rule of Trade Secrets Misappropriation Litigations],
RENMIN SIFA (人民司法) [THE PEOPLE’S JUDICATURE], No. 19, 2020, at 14 (arguing that the
new burden shifting rule may result in injustice by excessively reducing trade secret holder’s
burden of proof).
185 Id.
186 See id.
187 See generally Mark F. Schultz & Douglas C. Lippoldt, Approaches to Protection of
Undisclosed Information (Trade Secrets): BACKGROUND PAPER, NO. 162, OECD TRADE
POLICY PAPERS (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5jz9z43w0jnwen.pdf?expires=1635604817&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=74940FB27766B4C9EC
E9698C5A89686A [https://perma.cc/C52D-CD58].
183
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available in the US law, have remedied the weakness of the Chinese
discovery system. Therefore, the index can show that the Chinese
trade secrets system has become a rather strict one, nearly as strict as
US system. Apart from similar strict trade secrets rules, non-compete
clauses are expressly allowed in Chinese employment law. 188
Although the employment law sets several limits for the use of noncompete clauses, 189 the combination of a strict trade secrets law and
non-compete clauses arguably impede employee mobility to a great
extent. Thus, we could say that China, with its trade secret
protections supplemented by non-compete agreements, currently
adopts a regime that is at least as strict as the US’s. However, the
Chinese local industry is still quite underdeveloped compared to the
US industry, especially in technologies where trade secrets and noncompete clauses are active. 190 For example, although it is
acknowledged that the Chinese industry is increasingly developing
their indigenous technology under the strong governmental support
to R&D, “[h]igh-tech and innovative products and services are rarely
associated with China.”191 One report in 2019 shows that Chinese
firms still rely on key inputs (technology) from foreign firms,192 even
though they are producing more technology than ever before. 193
Accordingly, the local industry in China, especially in the technology
188
Sandy Zhang, China: Application of Non-Competes To Protect Business Secrets,
DENTONS (2017), https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/newsletters/2017/march/14/globalemployment-lawyer/global-employment-lawyer-2017/application-of-non-compete-inbusiness-secret-protection [https://perma.cc/MSM7-REHY].
189 See id. (specifying that “geographic scope, duration and type of employment or line
of business prohibited” as limits on the terms of non-compete obligations).
190 See Jennifer Brant & Sebastian Lohse, Trade Secrets: Tools for Innovation and
Collaboration, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 1, 9–10 (2014),
https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/ICC-Research-Trade-Secretsenglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/G68B-3JCY] (discussing how trade secrets function to protect
technology and why companies are more willing to use trade secrets to protect their
technology in many situations).
191 Naubahar Sharif, China as the World’s Technology Leader in the 21st Century:
Dream or Reality?, HKUST IEMS (Feb. 2016), https://iems.ust.hk/publications/thoughtleadership-briefs/china-as-the-worlds-technology-leader-in-the-21st-century-dream-orreality [https://perma.cc/5YN7-NQ8W].
192 See A New Great Game--China, The U.S., And Technology, S&P GLOB. RATINGS,
May 14, 2019, at 12–13, https://www.spglobal.com/_division_assets/images/specialeditorial/a-new-great-game-china-the-u.s.-and-technology/2019_05_csag_uschina.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JSM-YUHT] (finding that foreign suppliers are deeply embedded in
China’s technology supply chain, and Asian and US firms are especially important in
providing the intellectual-property-rich technology inputs into China’s supply chain).
193 Id. at 9–11.
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area, is underdeveloped compared to the US industry, as they still rely
significantly on foreign technology rather than their own. This
demonstrates that the local industry in China has a greater need for
developing and catching up with the industry in developed countries.
In other words, the value of cumulative innovations is much more for
the Chinese local industry for it to develop more indigenous
technology or products. As our previous analysis shows, the current
strict trade secrets law with non-compete clauses have already, to a
certain extent, impeded US industry’s development through blocking
cumulative innovations. The large companies can use the strict
protection regime to effectively squeeze start-ups or other small
competitors out of the market and maintain their monopoly in the
market, which is not beneficial for overall industrial development. 194
Adopting a similar strict regime for the local industry in China, which
has a greater need for cumulative innovations, may have an even
more harmful effect on local industry’s development compared to the
situation in the US. Therefore, it is an open question whether the
local industry in China, as a whole, really demands such a legislative
protection level, since industrial development benefits much more
from cumulative innovation.
So far, using the basic theories of trade secrets and the overprotection problems already existing in the US industry, we have
provided circumstantial evidence for the argument that Chinese local
industry indeed does not require such enhanced and strict protection.
In addition to this circumstantial evidence, some empirical studies
provide certain direct evidence. One study by the Beijing High Court
searched all judgments related to trade secrets infringement cases
made by Chinese courts from 2013–2017 and found there are only
338 trade secret cases that courts delivered a judgment on. 195
Compared with an average of 10,000 IP cases that courts pronounced
a judgment on each year from 2013 to 2017, trade secrets cases only
accounted for a very limited percentage. 196 Although this statistic
cannot represent all trade secret disputes in China because there may
194

See Graves & DiBoise, supra note 173, at 338–39 (discussing the lengthy time and
high costs in rebutting trade secret claims).
195 Beijing High People’s Court (北京市高级人民法院), She Shangye Mimi Anjian
Sifa Shenpan Diaoyan Baogao (涉商业秘密案件司法审判调研报告) [Empirical Report on
the Judicial Trial of Trade Secret Cases], Zhongguo Shenpan (中国审判) [CHINA TRIAL]
(Dec.
9,
2020),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/WINW2OXOOmJLG-AQoBAXGw
[https://perma.cc/YT2H-LNZ9].
196 Id.
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be many cases settled privately before or after the initiation of
litigation, considering that there are also many settlements in other IP
cases not represented by the data, such a low percentage can at least
provide some evidence that trade secrets infringement is not
happening that frequently compared to other types of IP infringement
in China. One may argue that the low number of cases reflected in
the statistics represents the effectiveness of the current trade secrets
law in deterring potential infringers and that this low percentage of
trade secrets cases cannot prove there is little need locally for such
laws. However, other current IP laws (copyright, patent, trademarks)
in China are also quite strict, and the Chinese government has adopted
increasingly harsher measures to enforce these laws.197 In China,
these IP laws are more mature and function more effectively than
trade secrets law. If the argument is that strict rules result in fewer
cases in court due to their deterrent effect, then we may also see fewer
IP cases as well. Thus, the argument that the limited number of trade
secrets litigations in court is due to the effectiveness of the current
law is inaccurate. This small number may be attributable, rather, to
the negligible need for such laws in reality. Given the low need for
such protection, it is doubtful whether such an enhanced and strict
protection regime is urgent or necessary for contemporary local
industry. Granting strict protections exceeding the needs of the
industry, as a whole, may only help large companies with control over
certain advanced information gain more monopolistic power and
squeeze the start-up competitors out of the market, harming the
growth of the Chinese industry.
2.

Main Reason: US Industry’s Representation of Interests

Why does the regime neglect the interests of local industry,
and what other problems may result from this neglect? The overrepresentation of the US industry’s interests is the main reason for
such neglect, and problems may be caused by the conflicting interests
of the US and local industries. As already explained, the Special 301
197 Copyright, Trademarks, and Patents have much longer developing period than trade
secrets. These three areas have consistently become targets of the US ever since its first
Special 301 report in 1989. Moreover, problems of effective enforcement of these laws have
also been consistently addressed by the US long before. With such a long period of
developments on both legislation and enforcement, these laws in China not only complies
with international standards (or even US standards) but also absorbs ample local experience.
These laws are arguably functioning more effectively than trade secrets.
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reports published by the USTR every year have served as a strong
mechanism to affect the development of the IPR regime in China,
including the trade secrets protection regime. The Special 301
process, however, is significantly affected by the US industry and
greatly represents the US industry’s interests and needs. Firstly, it is
argued that the Special 301 process and its related provisions are “the
direct result of heavy industry lobbying efforts,”198 serving as an
important forum for US industry to represent their interests and
express their opinions. Secondly, upon reading the Special 301
reports carefully, one may be surprised by how detailed the reports
are in describing situations in other countries and how exactly the US
industry has suffered losses in each foreign country. Although such
detailed and precise reports are published by the USTR each year,
they rely significantly on the inputs from the US industry.199 US
industry indeed is legally allowed to actively participate in the Special
301 process to supply information, submit comments and
recommendations to the USTR, and testify before Congress.200 For
example, the interested parties can submit information to the USTR
for it to take into account when identifying priority countries in the
reports.201 Many foreign countries perceive that inputs from “U.S.
industry tend to exaggerate the situation, or even distort the truth, to
create something out of nothing.” 202 Regardless of such criticism,
history shows that US industries, through the efforts of leading
industry representatives such as the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA) and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association (PMA), often successfully represent their interests and
have their opinions accepted by the USTR in the Special 301
process.203 Regarding the trade secrets protections in China, the US
industry, whose prominent representatives include the National
Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), the Intellectual Property Owners
Association (IPOA), and the U.S. Chamber’s Global Intellectual
Property Center (GIPC), also exerts a consistent and inexorable
influence on the Special 301 process to have their suggestions
198

Liu, supra note 27, at 92–93, 98.
Id.
200 Id. at 98.
201 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (b)(2)(B) (1988).
202 Liu, supra note 27, at 92.
203 See id. at 102–10 (finding that the comparison between the comments and allegations
provided by the leading US industries representatives and the corresponding Special 301
reports shows that US industries’ opinions were frequently adopted by the USTR).
199
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accepted by the USTR, and in turn to affect the development of trade
secrets protection in China.
Let us look back again to the development phase from 2012
to 2017, during which the trade secrets protection in China became
an increasingly important focus of the USTR in its Special 301
reports.204 The USTR received many public comments from the US
industry before each of the Special 301 reports was issued.205
Specifically, many previously alleged deficiencies of the trade secrets
protection in China were emphasized by these public comments, most
of which were adopted by the USTR in the Special 301 reports.
Firstly, the business operator requirement in the 1993 AUCL was
frequently identified as a problem limiting trade secrets protection in
China at that time by US industry represented by the NFTC, the
IPOA, and the GIPC, all of whom expressed their worry that the 1993
AUCL only applied to businesses instead of individuals, especially
current or former employees. 206
Secondly, US industry
204 The trade secret protection problems in China started to be mentioned again in the
2012 Special 301 report and were detailed described in the 2013 Special 301 report. After
2013, trade secret protections have consistently become an important issue addressed in the
Special 301 process. See supra Part II.C.
205 Public comments submitted by the US industry with regards to the Special 301
process can be found in the Federal Register, (https://www.regulations.gov/), with docket
number USTR–2011–0021 for 2012 Special 301 Review, USTR-2012-0022 for 2013
Special 301 Review, USTR–2013–0040 for 2014 Special 301 Review, USTR-2014-0025 for
2015 Special 301 Review, USTR-2015-0022 for 2016 Special 301 Review.
206 National Foreign Trade Council, Comment on the Office of United States Trade
Representative (USTR) Notice: 2013 Special 301 Review 8 (Feb. 8, 2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2012-0022-0018
[https://perma.cc/5V4E-6YSG] [hereinafter 2013 NFTC Comment]; Intellectual Property
Owners Association, Comment on the Office of United States Trade Representative (USTR)
Notice: Special Review of Countries that Do Not Provide Adequate Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights 11 (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-20130040-0023 [https://perma.cc/K83L-QQDD] [hereinafter 2014 IPOA Comment]; Intellectual
Property Owners Association, Comment on the Office of United States Trade Representative
(USTR) Notice: Special Review of Countries that Do Not Provide Adequate Protection of
Intellectual
Property
Rights
9
(Feb.
8,
2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2015-0022-0045
[https://perma.cc/WMU5-4USR] [hereinafter 2016 IPOA Comment]; U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Comment on the Office of United States Trade Representative (USTR) Notice:
Special Review of Countries that Do Not Provide Adequate Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights 49 (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-20130040-0006 [https://perma.cc/P5WQ-MLAW] [hereinafter 2014 GIPC Comment]; U.S.
Chamber of Commerce’s Global Intellectual Property Center, Comment on the Office of
United States Trade Representative (USTR) Notice: 2016 Special 301 Review: Identification
of Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974: Request for Public Comment and
Announcement
of
Public
Hearing
76
(Feb.
8,
2016),
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representatives such as the IPOA pointed out that the 1993 AUCL
imposed an additional ex-ante requirement for trade
secrets—”practical applicability”—limiting the protection scope of
trade secrets in China.207 Thirdly, the lack of adequate measures to
prevent leakage of trade secrets during governmental proceedings
was also a concern among US trade secrets holders. They maintained
that while Chinese regulations sometimes required companies to
submit information protected by trade secrets for supervision
purposes before they could get access to the Chinese market, there
was no provision existing at that time that prevents further disclosure
by Chinese government officials. 208 Thus, they demanded that new
measures imposing a confidentiality duty on governmental officials
should be drafted and enforced. 209 Furthermore, the US industry was
quite dissatisfied with the low damage awards in the 1993 AUCL for
trade secrets infringement. They perceived that “civil damages
remain insufficient in many cases to compensate companies for
infringement.”210 Moreover, the lack of preliminary injunctions for
trade secrets cases in China was also one of the US industry’s main
concerns. They alleged that Chinese courts either lacked the
authority to issue preliminary injunctions under the AUCL211 or that
Chinese courts rarely issued such injunctions though they had the
authority to do so under the Civil Procedure Law.212 As may be
recalled from the previous historical analysis, all of these five
problems identified by the US industry in their submitted public
comments were the ones addressed in the Special 301 reports from
2013 to 2017 and by the USTR and in the 24th & 25th JCCT.213 In
other words, all the concerns of US industry over the trade secrets
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2015-0022-0026
[https://perma.cc/3MER-H7XX] [hereinafter 2016 GIPC Comment].
207 2014 IPOA Comment, supra note 205, at 11.
208 Id.; 2014 GIPC Comment, supra note 205, at 50–51; 2016 GIPC Comment, supra
note 205, at 77.
209 U.S.-China Business Council, Comment on the Office of United States Trade
Representative (USTR) Notice: 2013 Special 301 Review; Public Hearing: Identification of
Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade Act 14 (Feb. 8, 2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2012-0022-0006
[https://perma.cc/C7N7-GUDY] [hereinafter 2013 USCBC Comment].
210 Id. at 16.
211 2013 NFTC Comment, supra note 205, at 8.
212 2014 GIPC Comment, supra note 205, at 50; 2016 IPOA Comment, supra note 205,
at 9; 2016 GIPC Comment, supra note 205, at 77.
213 See supra text accompanying note 89-98.
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issues in China during that period were fully addressed in the US
unilateral mechanism and the bilateral dialogues with China,
“forcing” China to amend laws to deal with US industry’s concerns.
As we now know, under pressure from the US, China amended its
1993 AUCL in 2017 and issued a new Judicial Interpretation in
response to most of these criticisms. 214 Through such process, the US
industry successfully resolved most of their concerns and thus
arguably substantially represented their interests in China’s
corresponding legal reforms to enhance the trade secrets legislative
protection level during that period.
Nevertheless, the enhanced legislative protection level and
stricter rules in the 2017 AUCL did not fully satisfy the US industry.
They were not pleased with the limited moves made in the 2017
AUCL to enhance trade secrets protection in China, and some viewed
it as a failed attempt to deliver the promise of increasing protection. 215
They expressed continued concerns in their public comments
submitted for the 2017–2019 Special 301 Review.216
One
dissatisfaction was the consistent uncertainty regarding whether the
2017 AUCL could apply to individuals—namely, the “business
operator” requirement.217 Specifically, though the GIPC in its
comment submitted for the 2018 Special Review admitted that the
direct implication of the 2017 AUCL going after infringers related to
trade secrets theft committed by current or former employees, 218 the
IPOA did not consider this as fully solving the uncertainty caused by
214 Leaving only the business operator requirement not fully clarified, which, however,
was finally dealt with in the 2019 AUCL. See supra Part II.D.
215 U.S. Chamber of Commerce., Comment on the Office of United States Trade
Representative (USTR) Notice: 2018 Special 301 Review (Feb. 11, 2018),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2017-0024-0013 [https://perma.cc/846Z4BG3] [hereinafter 2018 GIPC Comment].
216 Public comments submitted by the US industry with regards to the Special 301
process can be found in the Federal Register, (https://www.regulations.gov/), with docket
number USTR-2016-0026 for 2017 Special 301 Review, USTR-2017-0024 for 2018 Special
301 Review, USTR-2018-0037 for 2019 Special 301 Review, USTR-2019-0023 for 2020
Special 301 Review.
217 Intellectual Property Owners Association, Comment on the Office of United States
Trade Representative (USTR) Notice: 2018 Special 301 Review 11 (Feb. 11, 2018),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2017-0024-0014
[https://perma.cc/P8G4-DPVX] [hereinafter 2018 IPOA Comment]; Intell. Prop. Owners
Ass’n, Comment on the Office of United States Trade Representative (USTR) Notice: Public
Hearings:
2019
Special
301
Review
11
(Feb.
8,
2019),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2018-0037-0033
[https://perma.cc/SZ9Z-SXDZ] [hereinafter 2019 IPOA Comment].
218 2018 GIPC Comment, supra note 214, at 65.
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the “business operator” requirement and continuously urged China to
amend this requirement.219 Besides, the limited damages awarded to
compensate right holders was another continued concern for US
industry, leading the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)
to repeatedly demand that China boost damage awards to deter trade
secrets theft.220 Moreover, uncertainty about whether cyber-attacks
could amount to misappropriation, and the high evidentiary burden
on plaintiffs due to the absence of a burden-shifting mechanism were
considered by the US industry and were deemed (by the IPOA and
GIPC) urgent deficiencies that the 2017 AUCL had failed to
resolve.221 Again, all these continued concerns of the US industry
were represented in the 2018 and 2019 Special 301 Reports,222 urging
China to enhance the legislative protection level by plugging these
loopholes. All these complaints of US industry were addressed in the
2019 AUCL by China,223 which means that once again US industry’s
interests were substantially represented in China’s legal amendments
to further enhance trade secrets protection.
Recall that in previous sections we formulated an argument
that on each occasion the main framework for the enhancement of
trade secrets protection (the substance of all stricter rules) in China
was substantially affected by the US. From the analysis here, it is
appropriate to say that China’s enhancement of trade secrets
protection was indeed influenced by US industry. It followed a
pattern where the US industry identified problems and recommended
amendments through their public comments to the USTR for it to
219

2018 IPOA Comment, supra note 216, at 11; 2019 IPOA Comment, supra note 216,

at 11.
220

National AssociationNat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers, Comment on the Office of
United States Trade Representative (USTR) Notice: Public Hearings: 2019 Special 301
Review 22 (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2018-00370041 [https://perma.cc/BX4D-DPRQ] [hereinafter 2019 NAM Comment]; Nat’l Ass’n of
Mfrs., Comment on the Office of United States Trade Representative (USTR) Notice: 2018
Special 301 Review 19 (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR2017-0024-0034 [https://perma.cc/AV32-H5MS].
221 See, e.g., 2019 IPOA Comment, supra note 217, at 10–11; see also 2018 GIPC
Comment, supra note 215, at 64–65; see also U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Comment on the
Office of United States Trade Representative (USTR) Request for Public Comment: 2019
Special
301
Submission
98–99
(Feb.
7,
2019),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2018-0037-0039
[https://perma.cc/MJ96-AQPJ] [hereinafter 2019 GIPC Comment]; see also 2019 NAM
Comment, supra note 220, at 22.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 109-116.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 122-150.
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include in the Special 301 reports first, and the USTR then used its
Special 301 process and other bilateral tools to urge China to accept
these suggested amendments. Since all related legal amendments
mainly targeted and accounted for US industry’s concerns and
interests, the current protection regime arguably leaves very little
room for local industry to express their views, and thus to a certain
extent does not substantially take into account the interests of local
industry.
3.

But why bother?

The question, however, is why bother that the current regime
only substantially accounts for US industry’s interests rather than
local industry’s interests? Some may argue that so long as the strict
trade secrets law provides equal protection for local industry, it
benefits them in the same way. Following this argument, it seems as
if which industry’s interests the current regime accounts for does not
matter so much because the law provides the same protection for local
industry to protect their innovations from misappropriation as well.
In other words, there seem to be no conflicting interests between US
industry and local industry. Let us first assume there are no
conflicting interests. As we mentioned above, the strict regime not
only already harms the US industry’s development but may have a
more negative impact on the underdeveloped local industry.224 Such
a strict regime is promoted by large corporations with greater
monopolistic power over valuable information, who are the
supporters/members behind the US industry representatives in the
Special 301 process.225 The net effect would be that large companies
benefit more from the strict regime while deterring even lawful
competition and the development of small companies or start-ups.
That said, even if we assume there are no conflicting interests, it is
questionable whether the whole of the local industry truly benefits
224

See supra text accompanying notes 154-194.
For example, many members of the International Property Owner Association
(IPOA) are quite famous and large companies who have certain market share and
competitive power such as 3M Innovative Properties Co., AT&T, American Express
Company, Apple Inc., CPA Global North America LLC, Capital One, Cisco Systems, Inc.,
Google Inc., IBM Corp., LexisNexis IP, MasterCard International Incorporated, Nike, Inc.,
Oracle Corporation, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Sony Corporation of America, Uber.
For
a
full
member
list,
see
https://ipo.org/index.php/memberorganizations/[ https://perma.cc/3DPR-PHFE].
225
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from this strict regime, as it favors large companies too much
regardless of the need for cumulative innovation for smaller
companies. However, the US industry’s interests are generally not in
line with those of local industry, making the situation worse. The
problem lies in the comparative advantage that the US enjoys in
intellectual property-related goods or technology. US industry still
enjoys a significant competitive edge over the local industry with
regard to technology, since Chinese industrial sectors rely heavily on
importing key technology from the US.226 With such an unequal state
of affairs, adopting a strict trade secrets system by representing
mainly the interests of the US industry which already enjoys a
competitive advantage in exporting IP-related products or technology
leaves the local industry as importers with “nothing really to gain.” 227
More precisely, the Chinese local industry is relatively
underdeveloped compared to the US industry and demands more
space to innovate to grow and catch up with developed industries.
Development relies on self-research, and more importantly
cumulative innovations based on previous information. However, the
current strict trade secrets law combined with non-compete clauses
impedes cumulative innovations in a major way. A strict and harsh
trade secrets law can be utilized by trade secret holders to deter even
lawful use of certain information by others who want to innovate
around such information.228 This is because companies often try to
include even non-secret information (public information) in their
non-disclosure agreements or license agreements, treating this
information also as “trade secrets”. 229 With a strict trade secrets law
in hand, they can still sue the information users who, for fear of the
uncertain litigation outcomes and large litigation costs, may simply
quit using such information in the first place even if such use may be
legal.230 Cumulative innovation is thus substantially harmed. In the
US–China context, this means that US companies that enjoy a large
226

See supra text accompanying notes 190-193.
See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 11 (2002) (“The rest of the developed countries and all
developing countries were in the position of being importers with nothing really to gain by
agreeing to terms of trade for intellectual property that would offer so much protection to the
comparative advantage the US enjoyed in intellectual property-related goods”).
228 See Varadarajan, supra note 172 at 1564–66; see also Graves & DiBoise, supra note
173 at 337–38.
229 See Varadarajan, supra note 172 at 1565.
230 See Graves & DiBoise, supra note 173, at 337–39.
227
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comparative edge in exporting technology or advanced products can
easily use broad non-disclosure or licensing agreements to cover any
information they deem valuable and deter Chinese corporations,
through strict trade secrets law which favors the right holders more,
from innovating around any information. Moreover, in the
employer–employee context, strict trade secrets law and noncompete clauses may prevent employees from lawfully moving to
other competitors and even using their knowledge to research in the
same line.231 Relying on harsh trade secrets law and non-compete
clauses, US companies can effectively prevent their employees from
moving to work in Chinese corporations that urgently need
experienced employees to develop. As such, adopting such a strict
regime representing mainly US industry interests reduces
opportunities for local industry to innovate and develop; in other
words, it harms the local industry’s interests. It mainly helps the US
industry to maintain its competitive edge in advanced technology and
products at the expense of local industry’s development needs. This
is clearly the goal of the US government in consistently pushing
China to adopt a harsher trade secrets regime. Ironically, before the
US became the leading exporter of IP-related products, it was the one
resisting strong intellectual property protections, knowing what
negative effect strict protections would have on local industry’s
growth. For example, before US creations started being increasingly
used in other countries,232 the US “was exceptionally parochial in
copyright matters, not only denying any protection to the published
works of nonresident foreign authors, but actually appearing to
encourage piracy.”233 The US knew clearly that as an importer of IPrelated works rather than an exporter, 234 denying strict protection
could aid the development of local industry and help it innovate

231

See supra text accompanying notes 175–76.
Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-Past,
Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L. J. 1050, 1058 (1968) (“following the First World War, the
increasing use of American works in other countries brought with it a demand that the United
States adhere to the Berne Convention. Beginning in 1922, a series of bills for this purpose
was introduced in Congress.”).
233 Id. at 1054.
234 See id. at 1055 (nothing that, at the time, the main exporters were Great Britain and
France).
232
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further at lower costs and that granting a protection level exceeding
local needs could most benefit the exporter countries.235
However, by criticizing the strict regime caused by the overrepresentation of US industry’s interests, this article does not claim
that strict laws provide no benefits for the local industry which has
no need for strict protections, or that China should lift the strict rules
established currently. Strict laws can function to fulfill the most
important
policy
goal
of
trade
secrets—incentivizing
creation/innovation.
In the absence of strict rules, original
innovations may be discouraged. Thus, it is true that China should
spare no effort to protect trade secrets owned by parties, regardless of
their nationality. Moreover, Chinese corporations themselves are in
increasing need of adequate trade secrets protection and can benefit,
to a certain extent, from strict rules.236 When considered from this
angle, Chinese local industry’s interests are in line with US industry’s
interests. However, the above analysis shows that the local industry
as a whole benefits from a more lenient regime that provides greater
opportunities for cumulative innovation. Therefore, what this article
proposes, instead, is to impose reasonable limiting doctrines on the
current strict trade secrets rules in China to account more for the
developmental needs of local industry and to make them more
consistent with other IP laws which have effective limiting tools to
curb any potential harm to cumulative innovation. For example, in
light of the current debate among US scholars as mentioned above, a
trade secrets abandonment doctrine (by analogy with trademarks
abandonment) and a fair use doctrine (analogous to copyright fair
use) may be introduced into the current regime to alleviate the
negative consequences caused by the strict rules. A strict regime with
reasonable limiting mechanisms can adequately protect the trade
235

See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 227, at 32-33 (discussing how US
publishing was built upon the piracy upon European works and US publishers were opposed
to change US policy towards copyright then).
236 One notable trade secrets case brought by the local corporation is the Baidu v.
Wangxun in 2017. Baidu is a Chinese multinational technology company that is famous for
its search engine. Wangxun is a former senior vice-president and general manager of the
autonomous driving unit of Baidu. He resigned from Baidu and opened a start-up in the US
also in the area of autonomous driving. Baidu sued Wangxun alleging that he took away
relevant data and infringed trade secrets of Baidu. This case can be an example for showing
local industry needs for protections. See Jing Shuiyu, Baidu Suing Former Executive Wang
Jing
(Dec.
22,
2017,
5:16
PM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201712/22/WS5a3ccd8ea31008cf16da2f35.html.
[https://perma.cc/J8UC-VDF3].
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secrets of local and foreign companies while leaving sufficient room
for local industry to develop.
4.

Summary

In sum, the development route of trade secrets protection in
China has resulted in insufficient consideration of local industry’s
interests and needs, which may impede local developmental
requirements. By comparison with the negative effect of the strict
trade secrets rules in the US on industrial innovation and
development, this section has shown that the current strict trade
secrets rules in China have an even more harmful effect on the
development of China’s underdeveloped local industry. Combining
this circumstantial evidence with some direct evidence from local
empirical studies, this section demonstrates that the current protection
regime actually exceeds the Chinese local industry’s needs. Such a
strict protection regime may only strengthen large corporations’
monopoly, which may lead to undesirable consequences for local
industry’s innovations and growth. The local industry’s interests
were not substantially accounted for in the current regime. The main
reason is that the US industry consistently used their statutory tools
to provide detailed input to the USTR, which in turn promotes the
adoption of these “suggestions” in China’s legal amendments. This
naturally makes the protection regime in China account more for the
US industry’s views and interests, which conflicts with the local
interests. US industry’s competitive edge is being preserved at the
expense of local industry’s growth.
Notwithstanding these
conclusions, this article does not entirely repudiate the current strict
rules, but, just like some US scholars currently propose, it hopes to
impose reasonable limiting doctrines in the regime to account better
for local industry’s developmental needs and to make trade secrets
protection better serve its policy goals.
Another thing to emphasize is that this article only deals with
the law in the books rather than the law in practice. Some may argue
that, while China may have enhanced its trade secrets protection in
the books, it may not enforce the law fully in practice. According to
this view, even if the law in the books is enhanced, its lack of
enforcement means that China has not, in fact, increased its protection
level. It is beyond the scope of this article to respond to this counterargument about the enforcement level in China. However, based on
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this article, future studies can put more focus on the empirical side of
trade secrets law in action in China.
B.

Insufficient Local Research Backing the Protection

Another consequence of such a development route is that the
local academic research takes or has to take, due to the intense US
pressure, the theories backing trade secrets protection and all
enhanced protections as a given. On the basic theory level, Chinese
scholars seem to rarely ask why trade secrets should be treated as
intellectual property or, in other words, why it is appropriate to use
IP theories to justify trade secrets—a question heatedly debated
among US scholars. US scholars have strived to search for
justifications for modern trade secrets protection by examining torts
theory, property theory, commercial morality theory, and intellectual
property theory.237 Professor Bone argued that none of these theories
can justify trade secrets properly, and he harshly criticized the use of
IP theories (i.e., utilitarian justification) to justify trade secrets.238
Responding to Professor Bone’s arguments, Professor Lemley argues
that trade secrets serve most policy goals of IP (incentives to innovate
and incentives to disclose), so that it is appropriate to treat trade
secrets as one type of IP.239 Professor Bone hit back, pointing out the
defects in Professor Lemley’s arguments, and reiterated his position,
that IP theories cannot justify modern trade secrets protection. 240
Regardless of which answer is the most convincing, these discussions
leave us with huge academic resources about the policy goals of trade
secrets that this article has already discussed. In particular, these
scholarly debates have partially triggered scholars to turn their
research focus to imposing limiting doctrines in trade secrets law so
as to curb the negative impact of the current strict rules and to direct
trade secrets more in the direction of being a type of IP.241 Professor
Lemley himself questioned the justifiability of protecting trade
secrets for an indefinite time if they are treated as an IP, in his 2008

237
238
239
240
241

See Lemley, supra note 19 at 320-341; Varadarajan, supra note 154 at 1414-1420.
See Bone, supra note 17 at 251-259.
See Lemley, supra note 19 at 329-341.
See Bone, supra note 170 at 1812-1819.
See Hrdy and Lemley, supra note 178.
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article,242 and thus argued for adding trade secrets abandonment
doctrine to the regime, in his recent work. 243
Looking back at the scholarly works in China, few have made
the effort to discuss the justifications underlying trade secrets
protection. After trade secrets officially began to be considered as
one type of IP since the General Provisions of the Civil Law in 2017
under US pressure,244 many Chinese scholars seem to take it as for
granted that trade secrets are an IP, without discussing why we treat
them in this way.245 Professor Kong Xiangjun, a well-known trade
secrets scholar in China, holds the position that there is no need in
China to discuss the theories backing trade secrets, as is done in the
US because recognizing trade secrets does not negate any prior
theories in China.246 Thus, he argues that we only need to place trade
secrets in a position of being current theories and legislations
(namely, giving this aspect a position in IP theories and laws), which
suffices within the context of Chinese law.247 Professor Kong is right
on the point that treating trade secrets as an IP in China will not cause
conflict between theories like in the US, so that putting it in the
position of IP is acceptable, even if such classification is indeed
significantly influenced by the US. However, what is important is
not the mere classification, but the question as to whether trade
secrets can appropriately serve the policy goals of IP. In other words,
we can simply classify trade secrets as IP in China either because in
the Chinese context there is no conflict, or because US scholars have
already done much of these basic theories studies so that we can
gratefully accept the theories without the need to put wasteful effort
242

See Lemley, supra note 19 at 353.
See Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 178 at 75-83.
244 GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S 123,123REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (中华人民共和国民法总则), CLI.1.291593, art. 123 (2017); CIVIL CODE123,123, OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (中华人民共和国民法典), CLI.1.342411, art. 123
(2021). The US pressure can be seen in the 2017 Special 301 Report. See 2017 Special 301
Report, supra note 42, at 30.
245 Only very limited scholar works in China comprehensively discuss why trade secrets
are treated as an IP and the theories underpinning trade secrets protection. See, e.g., Liu
Chuntian (刘春田) & Zheng Xuanyu (郑璇玉), Shangye Mimi de Fali Fenxi (商业秘密的
法理分析) [Theoretical Analysis of Trade Secrets], FAXUE JIA (法学家) [THE JURIST], no. 3,
2004, at 106–113; Lin Xiuqin (林秀芹), Shangye Mimi Zhishi Chanquan Hua de Lilun Jichu
(商业秘密知识产权化的理论基础) [Theoretical Underpinnings of Treating Trade Secrets
as an IP], GANSU SHEHUI KEXUE (甘肃社会科学) [GANSU SOC. SCI.], no. 2, 2020
(discussing the theories underlying protecting trade secrets as an IP).
246 See KONG, supra note 19, at 357.
247 Id.
243
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into researching them again. However, discussing the underlying
theories of such a classification serves another significant goal, in
helping us to rethink whether the current trade secrets protection
really serves the policy goals of IP properly—promoting innovation
within the industry. These discussions can facilitate theoretical
questioning about the current strict trade secrets rules in China and
also enlighten Chinese scholars to think about introducing limitation
doctrines into the regime to help trade secrets protection better serve
its policy goals, as the current US scholars have done in their work.
The lack of such focus on underlying theories may be part of the
reason why many Chinese scholars again take the specific legal
amendments “suggested” by the US as a given. They tend to focus
more on arguing for the necessity of enhancing these protections as
“suggested” by the US rather than taking a step back to think about
what negative consequences a stricter regime may have on the local
industry’s development.248 Perhaps they even lacked the chance to
do so because even with it, their recommendations against any strict
rules might have been hard for the Chinese government to accept at a
point when US pressure was quite intense. That said, because of the
US influence on the legislation of trade secrets protection in China,
many Chinese scholars seem to take or have taken it for granted that
trade secrets should be treated as IP, consequently neglecting the
importance of the theoretical discussions underlying such
classification. Such insufficient research focuses on underpinning
theories may result in inadequate scholarly reflection on China’s
current strict protection regime, which may harm innovation within
the local industry. Using basic theories to figure out whether and how
China should impose limiting doctrines in the current strict regime to
alleviate the accompanying social costs of this regime has become a
248

For example, many scholars argue in favor of shifting burden of proof to the
defendants in trade secrets infringement cases by simply stating that such burden shifting
can benefit right holders, just as the US suggested in its Special 301 Reports, without
questioning the potential negative results of such burden shifting. See, e.g.,
ZilimiyaZilimila· Ainiwaer (孜里米拉·艾尼瓦尔), Shilun Fan BuZhengdang Jingzheng Fa
Xiuzheng’an de Shangye Mimi Tiaokuan (试论反不正当竞争法修正案的商业秘密条款)
[Discussions on the Trade Secrets Provisions in the Amendments for Anti-Unfair
Competition Law], KEJI YU FALÜ (科技与法律) [SCI. TECH. L.], no. 2, 2020, at 74. Cf. Cui,
supra note 181 (arguing that although shifting burden of proof in current trade secrets
protection regime may alleviate the burden on plaintiffs, it, however, unreasonably increases
the burden on some weak defendants which may impose too high social costs). Professor
Cui is one of the very view scholars in China questions about shifting burden of proof in
current regime.
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barren land in Chinese academic research that few scholars touch
upon.249

IV.

SUGGESTIONS FOR CHINA

After exploring how the US has significantly affected the
development of China’s trade secrets rules and protection level,
which has resulted in the current regime’s insufficient consideration
of local industry’s needs and insufficient academic focus on basic
theories, this section tries to provide some suggestions for China to
alleviate these negative consequences in the future at different levels.
Although these suggestions may not be very comprehensive or ripe,
this section, by putting forward this preliminary advice, hopes to
point out some directions that China can move towards.
At the legislation level, the protection level should not be
increased anymore at this point. In other words, we should not add
any more or stricter rules into the current regime before we truly
know whether an even stricter regime benefits the whole industry or
not. Such an answer requires more evidence based on serious
research and sufficient empirical evidence. This relates to the
suggestions at the academic research level. First, it is time that
Chinese scholars start to turn their focus from simply justifying each
strict protection rule in the regime to considering the potential
negative effect of a strict regime as a whole on local industrial
development. It is a necessity that scholars research deeply into the
underlying public goals and theories of trade secrets and rethink the
current strict regime based on these basic theories. One more specific
suggestion, thus, is that scholars may consider whether limiting
doctrines—and, if so, what kinds—should be introduced into the
current regime to help trade secrets protection better fulfill the policy
goals as an IP. For example, scholars may consider whether adding
limiting doctrines to the current strict regime will help trade secrets
protection to foster innovation within the industry. They may also
study whether and how the currently discussed or implemented
limiting doctrines in the US such as fair use, abandonment, or public
policy exception can be transplanted into China’s trade secrets
protection regime.
Secondly, scholars and practitioners can
249 Upon researching the CNKI database (the largest and most frequently used database
in China for collections of scholarly works in China), I did not find any comprehensive
studies on imposing limitations on trade secret protections in China.
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collaborate to conduct more empirical studies on the effect of the
current regime on industrial growth. 250 For instance, empirical
evidence concerning the compounding effect of strict trade secrets
rules and non-competing clauses on the Chinese industry is required.
Also, empirical evidence about whether current limiting doctrines
(reverse engineering and independent development) can successfully
function to curb the social costs of trade secrets protection in China
is urgently needed.251 Such empirical evidence can complement pure
academic research evidence and can better guide any future
amendments to the protection regime.
Some may question that if China does not legislate any stricter
rules in the future, how can the Chinese government cope with
potential future US pressure. As this article has already argued, at
least at the legislative protection level, China’s trade secrets regime
has adopted similar rules as the US. It is predicted that the US may
not push China to adopt any stricter rules at the legislation level.
Instead, the US may focus more on the effectiveness of enforcement
of the current regime. For example, apart from monitoring the Phase
One Agreement implementation situations, the USTR in the 2020
Special 301 Report mainly focuses on enforcement concerns such as
the effectiveness of the 2018 Judicial Interpretation on preliminary
injunctions for IP disputes in real cases instead of “recommending”
other stricter rules. 252 Therefore, it is foreseeable that the main
concern for the US in the future would be improving enforcement
rather than further enhancing the legislative protection level. With
regard to the enforcement level, it is suggested that the Chinese
government strives to increase the enforcement level of the law in the
book concerning trade secrets protection. Strengthening IPR
enforcement can equip the Chinese government with more
confidence and a solid foundation in future negotiations with the US
government. Specific topics that China may focus on in raising
250

For some examples of empirical works conducted by the US scholars, see David S.
Almeling, Darin W. Snyder & Michael Sapoznikow, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (2009); see also David S. Almeling,
Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow & Whitney E. McCollum, A Statistical Analysis of
Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57 (2010).
251 Some US scholarly works have provided an economic analysis for the effect of
reverse engineering. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002) (noting that law and
economic analysis of reverse engineering in different industry sectors).
252 See 2020 Special 301 Report, supra note 10, at 41–42.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol17/iss1/4

194

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 17

enforcement levels in the future are promoting the judicial
consistency in trade secrets issues by means such as issuing guiding
judgments, improving the expertise of judges in dealing with trade
secrets cases, and increasing the transparency of governmental and
judicial proceedings in trade secrets cases.
However, one point related to the legislation that may still be
questioned by the US is whether China should adopt a standalone
trade secrets law in the near future. While China has shown much
respect for US “suggestions” to enhance trade secrets protection by
adding strict rules, it still does not have a standalone trade secrets law.
As we can see from history, China adheres to its original way of
protecting trade secrets mainly through the AUCL and related judicial
interpretations.253 The lack of a Chinese standalone trade secrets law
still remains a target of US criticism254 because attacking this “defect”
remains a strong weapon for the US to achieve certain future
objectives. In this sense, whether or not China should promulgate a
standalone trade secrets law is still an important matter for China in
dealing with its trade relations with the US. Although such a
discussion is beyond the scope of this article, it does put forth the
proposition that we should be cautious about promulgating a new law.
Certain conditions should be met before China adopts a new
standalone trade secrets law. First, again, future research should test
the effects of the current strict regime on local industrial innovation.
Second, studies should investigate the necessity of imposing more
limiting doctrines and, if deemed necessary, detail how to transplant
and impose them. Third, academic research evidence and empirical
evidence are both needed to support that local industry’s needs have
developed to such a level as truly demands a standalone trade secrets
253 See Zheng Youde (郑友德) & Qian Xiangyang (钱向阳), Lun Woguo Shangye Mimi
Baohu Zhuanmen Fa de Zhiding (论我国商业秘密保护专门法的制定) [Discussions About
Promulgating a Specialized Stand-Alone Trade Secret Protection Law], DIANZI ZHISHI
CHANQUAN (电子知识产权) [Elec. Intell. Prop.], no. 10, 2018, at 56–58 (discussing that
current trade secret protection provisions can be found in different laws in China); See also
Ma Zhongfa (马忠法) & Li Zhongchen (李仲琛), Zailun Woguo Shangye Mimi Baohu de
Lifa Moshi (再论我国商业秘密保护立法的模式) [Discussion About the Legislation
Method of Protecting Trade Secrets in China], DIANZI ZHISHI CHANQUAN (电子知识产权)
[Elec. Intell. Prop.], no. 12, 2019, at 8–9 (discussing the current legislation method of
protecting trade secrets in China and how it comes into being); see also Zhou, supra note 48,
at 133–34 (comparing the methods of protecting trade secrets in the US and China, while the
latter adopts the method of protecting through different laws).
254 See 2018 Special 301 Report, supra note 109 at 40; see also 2017 Special 301 Report,
supra note 42, at 30.
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law. Before these conditions are met, it is advised that China
maintains status quo, allowing the academic research and local
industry to develop for a certain amount of time, first.
Although the US criticism of the lack of a standalone law may
return sooner or later, this article predicts that China may have
already secured respite255 after the Phase One Agreement, which does
not require a standalone trade secrets law in China. This is also
evidenced by the 2020 Special 301 Report which does not demand
China adopting a new law anymore but rather focuses mainly on the
implementation of the agreement and enforcement situations of the
current regime in China.256 It is foreseeable that at least during the
implementation period of the agreement, China has a breathing
period to delay its agenda for a standalone law. China should use the
breathing period to let academic research and local industry develop
first and wait until all the abovementioned conditions are satisfied,
before finally legislating a standalone law.

CONCLUSION
China’s trade secrets protection law is not a product of its own
industry’s growth, but rather the outcome of US–China trade
negotiations. This article is a first attempt at comprehensively
examining how the US affected the development of China’s trade
secrets regime, mainly through its strong Special 301 process.
Highlighting the development route, it is argued that each time legal
amendments added strict rules to enhance the legislative protection
level, they followed US “recommendations.” Evidence demonstrates
that the current strict trade secrets regime in China exceeds the local
255 In Chapter 1 (Intellectual Property) of the Phase One Agreement, Article 1.35 only
requires China to promulgate an Action Plan within 30 working days after the date of entry
into force of the Phase One Agreement to provide measures that China will take to implement
its obligations under Chapter 1. No specific dates are mentioned in the Phase One
Agreement. CNIPA issued its 2020-2021 Implementation of the Opinions on Strengthening
the Protection of Intellectual Property Promotion Plan on April 20, 2020 and prescribed 133
measures to be taken in the future. Many measures do not stipulate a date but merely use the
phrase “continue to advance”. Therefore, there is still a long way to go before China
implements all these measures, which may give China a long breathing period. For details
of the CNIPA action plan, see the link inside the article: Mark Cohen, Is It In There –
CNIPA’s “Phase 1” IP Action Plan?, CHINA IPR(Apr. 22, 2020),
https://chinaipr.com/2020/04/22/is-it-in-there-cnipas-phase-1-ip-action-plan
[https://perma.cc/5NQE-UEBY].
256 See 2020 Special 301 Report, supra note 10, at 38–39.
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industry’s needs and may impede local industrial innovation. Such
interests are being neglected because of the substantial representation
of the US industry’s interests in China’s legal amendments. Since the
US industry’s interests conflict considerably with the local industry’s
interests, the current strict regime in China may only benefit the US
industry in preserving their competitive edge at the expense of unduly
impeding the local industry’s growth. Furthermore, this development
path has also influenced many local scholars to take trade secrets
protection for granted and put the research focus mainly on further
enhancing protection without taking a step back to examine basic
theories and limiting doctrines. In light of the development path and
the accompanying negative consequences, this article has tried to
provide some directions that China may move towards, in legislation
and academic research and at the government levels. Any future
changes in China’s trade secrets protection legislation can be more
spontaneous and should account more for local industry’s interests,
and future academic research can provide deeper theoretical
discussion and more feasible recommendations.
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ANNEX
Table 1: Summary of Developments
Changes to Protections
Mere contractual protections
Basic Protection System Established
•
Information Scope:
•
Technology or Business information;
•
Requirements:
•
secrecy,
commercial
value,
practical applicability, reasonable measures to
keep secret.
•
Scope of protection:
•
Misappropriation.
•
Business Operator requirement;
•
Remedies:
•
Civil;
•
Administrative.
Details added
•
administrative remedies
Details added
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Year
Before 1993
1993

Authority
Contract Law
1993 AUCL

1995

1995
Administrative No
Regulation
2007 Judicial Interpretation
No

2007

US influence
No
•
1991 Special 301 report;
•
1992 China–US Memorandum of
Understanding.
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•
e.g., the definition and examples of each
requirement;
Limitations/Exclusions
•
reverse engineering and independent
development.
Stricter Rules
2017
•
Practical applicability deleted;
•
Statutory damage cap increased;
•
Confidentiality duty on government
officials imposed;
•
Employee misappropriation emphasized;
•
Preliminary Injunction allowed.
Stricter Rules
2019 & 2020
•
“Business Operator “ concerned cleared;
•
Cyber theft addressed;
•
Burden shifting added;
•
Statutory damage cap increased;
•
Punitive damage allowed;
•
Information scope expanded;
•
Preliminary Injunction allowed.
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2017 AUCL;
2018 Judicial Interpretation

•
•

2012-2017 Special 301 Reports;
24th & 25th JCCT.

2019 AUCL;
•
2020 Judicial Interpretation & •
Administrative Regulation

2018-2019 Special 301 Reports;
Phase One Agreement.
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Table 2: Comparison between China and the US Trade Secrets Law 257
Category
Source of
Definition
Scope

Index
Sub-Index
Law, Statutory
or Civil
and Other Protection

Definition

257

United States258
Civil protection
pursuant
to
statute.

All confidential business No.
information
Common
Definition: Yes.
Confidential
business
information, subject to:
deriving value from secrecy;
reasonable
and
making
reasonable efforts to maintain
secrecy

China259
Civil
protection
pursuant to the
statute (AUCL) and
judicial
interpretations.
No.
Yes.

This chart is made according to the Trade Secrets Protection Index created by the OECD. See MARK F. SCHULTZ & DOUGLAS C. LIPPOLDT, APPROACHES
PROTECTION OF UNDISCLOSED INFORMATION (TRADE SECRETS), OECD TRADE POLICY PAPERS No. 162 193-199 (2014),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz9z43w0jnw-en [https://perma.cc/XU4Z-QVWJ]. However, since this chapter does not focus on criminal remedies but limits its
scope to mere civil remedies, the index for criminal related elements has been deleted.
258 The features/elements of the US law are based on the findings by OECD. See id. at 193-199.
259
The features /elements of the Chinese law are summarized by the author from the PRC AUCL, the 2020 Judicial Interpretation, and the PRC Criminal
Code. See generally, 2019 AUCL, supra note 1; see also generally, 2020 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 1.
TO
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Covered
Acts
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Common definition plus
condition that it be imparted
to recipient in confidence
Additional
Use must be shown
Elements
of Inventory of trade secrets
Definition
required
Must be reduced to writing
Must be identified as a trade
secret to recipient
Written notice to recipient
required
Scope
Confidential
Business
Information
Technical Information
Acts Covered as Breach of Duty?
Civil
Wrongful
Infringement
Acquisition/Misappropriation
Third Parties:
Civil
1.
Liable for
Acquisition?
2.
Liable
Even if Innocent

No.

No.

No.
No.

No.
No.

No.
No.

No.
No.

No.

No.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.
Yes.

Yes.
Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

1.
Yes.
2.
No. Only
liable if third
party
has
knowledge
or
reason to know.

1.
Yes.
2.
No.
Only
liable if third party
has knowledge or
reason to know.
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(Without
Knowledge)?
Defining
Duties Defining Duty of Commercial Relationship
and
Confidentiality
Misappropriation

Duty can be
based on express
contract
or
implied.

Current
Relationship

Employment Duty can be
based on express
contract
or
implied.

Past
Relationship

Employment Duty can be
based on express
agreement
or
implied.
In some
states,
doctrine

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol17/iss1/4

Duty can be based
on express contract
or implied (Article
10 of the 2020
Judicial
Interpretation).
Duty can be based
on express contract
or implied (Article
10 of the 2020
Judicial
Interpretation).
Duty can be based
on express contract
or implied (Article
10 of the 2020
Judicial
Interpretation).

US
the
of The doctrine
inevitable

of
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Restrictions
on Commercial Relationship
Duty
of
confidentiality

Employment Relationship

inevitable
disclosure does not
disclosure exists. exist in the statute
or
judicial
interpretation but
some courts, in
reality, use this
doctrine.260
None
beyond None beyond public
ordinary
information.
competition law
concerns. Ends
with
public
disclosure
of
confidential
information
Ends with public None
beyond
disclosure
of general skills and
confidential
knowledge; None
information
beyond
public
information.

260 See Nie Xing (聂鑫), Shangye Mimi Bukepilu Yuanze De Zhidu Fazhan Yu Yizhi Shexiang (商业秘密不可避免披露原则的制度发展与移植设想)
[The Development and Transplantation Plans for the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine in Trade Secrets Law], ZHISHI CHANQUAN (知识产权), INTELL. PROP. No.
9 (2016) at 71.
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Defining
Civil
Wrongful
Acquisition
Misappropriation

Restrictions
Additional Civil
on Liability
Elements of Proof
in Infringement
Claim
Contractual
Commercial Relationship
Restrictions
on
Competition
Validity
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Obtaining
Obtaining secrets
secrets by tort, by theft, bribery,
crime,
fraud,
duress,
espionage,
or electronic intrusion,
other act that or
any
other
circumvents
improper means.
reasonable
security
measures.
None.
None.

Per se prohibited Uncertain.
in some states.
If not, must be
related to the
protection
of
trade
secrets,
limited
in
duration
and
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Post-Employment
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geographic
scope.
Per se prohibited
in some states. If
not, must be
related to the
protection
of
trade
secrets,
limited
in
duration
and
geographic
scope.

Significant
limitations.
Must be related to
the protection of
trade secrets and
other confidential
information about
IP rights, limited in
duration (no more
than two years) and
geographic scope;
monthly
compensations
should be paid;
limited to only
senior management,
senior
technical
personnel and other
personnel
with
confidentiality duty.
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Defenses

Civil

Civil Remedies

Preliminary injunction

Permanent injunction

Injunction to
eliminate wrongful head start
Delivery up and/or

261

Independent
creation.
Reverse
engineering.
Yes.
Temporary
restraining
orders and other
ex parte action
available.

Independent
development.
Reverse
engineering.
Yes. Ex parte action
available
if
in
urgent situations or
if notifying the
other party may
affect
the
injunctions.261
Yes (For so long Yes.
as
remains (For so long as
secret).
remains secret as
the default rule).
Uncertain.
Yes.
(If the period of the
default
rule
is
unreasonable).
Yes.
Yes.

See 2018 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 106 at arts. 2 and 5; 2020 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 1, at art. 15.
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destruction of infringing
materials
Compensatory Damages –
Direct.
Availability and Type
Consequential.
Lost Profits.
Defendant’s Profits
Yes.
Punitive damages available?
Yes.
Statutory or Pre-established No.
damages
Enforcement,
Enforcement,
Emergency
Search
to Yes.
investigation and investigation and preserve and obtain proof
Ex
parte
discovery
& discovery
available.
related regulations
Pre-trial discovery
Most extensive
in world.
Documentary,
interrogatories,
depositions.
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Direct.
Consequential.
Lost Profits.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes. Conducted by
the officials.
Ex parte available
No
such
an
extensive discovery
system in place.
However,
other
mechanisms (e.g.,
burden
shifting
clauses, order for
production of a
document) are in
place to facilitate
the discovery.
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Technology
Transfer

Legal
Complements
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Protection of confidentiality In
camera
of trade secrets in litigation
hearings
available.
Protection
of
documents
available.
Protection from
other
party
available.
None.

Fraser Score

On the Fraser
Institute Index of
Economic
Freedom’s
component index
for Legal System
and Security of
Property Rights

Reasonable
confidentiality
measures available.
Protection
of
documents,
evidence available.
Protection from the
other
party
available.
In the process of
removing
requirements,
as
promised in the USChina Phase One
Agreement.
On
the
Fraser
Institute Index of
Economic
Freedom’s
component index
for Legal System
and Security of
Property
Rights
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(2018), the US
receives a score
of 7.33 out of 10,
which ranks it
20nd in the
world.262

262 JAMES GWARTNEY,
et al., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2020 ANNUAL REPORT, FRASER
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/economic-freedom-of-the-world-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GWJ-EP2W].
263 See id. at 11.
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(2018),
China
receives a score of
4.93 out of 10,
which ranks it 86th
in the world.263

INSTITUTE

15

(2020),

